Global Disruption Status — evidence history

Hormuz traffic has fallen to its lowest since 7 May: only one oil tanker crossed on Thursday — the New Giant, carrying about 2 million barrels of Iraqi Basrah crude to China — and no other oil tanker entered the strait that day (Reuters), against a ~138/day norm. Every carrier that does cross runs with transponders off, so visible counts understate real movement. JMIC assesses deliberate hostile action as highly likely (SEVERE). The attacks are now sustained: UKMTO reports two tankers abandoned by their crews within 24 hours after projectile strikes off Oman — the latest about eight nautical miles north-east of Limah — while Dynacom confirmed two of its managed vessels were hit off the Omani coast, one of them abandoned. Crews reached lifeboats; no injuries or environmental impact have been reported, and not every vessel has been officially identified. India has barred its seafarers from Hormuz voyages. Over the weekend Hormuz stayed in single digits — about seven commodity vessels crossed Friday, three on Saturday (all dark) and seven on Sunday (Kpler) — so the strait has not meaningfully reopened even as oil futures fall. Traffic then thinned further: Reuters reported just five commodity vessels through the strait on Tuesday 28 July, and Tehran has rejected an Omani proposal for regional management of the waterway. A senior Iranian official confirmed to Reuters on 29 July that Tehran has ruled out Oman’s plan for joint regional management including voluntary transit fees — closing off the main diplomatic route out of an impasse that has choked Gulf trade for months. Tehran called the plan “unreasonable”: a 50-50 arrangement with Oman would not serve its interests, and Iran wants sole control of the inbound route and partial control of the outbound one — a waterway it says it controls and where it aims to collect fees. The IRGC says it retains full control of the strait and claims it struck three tankers attempting to transit by an “unauthorised route”; Washington has been directing ships to hug the Omani shore instead. The human cost is now explicit: recent Hormuz attacks killed one Indian seafarer, injured others and left one missing, and INTERTANKO is advising owners to delay transits where possible, review AIS and LRIT policies in high-risk areas — and to pay transit fees to neither Iranian nor Houthi authorities. A single passage does not equal normalisation: the QatarEnergy-controlled LNG carrier Al Areesh transited the strait overnight into 30 July after being permitted to use an Iran-designated route — the first QatarEnergy-controlled LNG tanker out of Hormuz in almost three weeks. It proves the strait is navigable by permission, not that commercial traffic has returned to anything like its former scale. Thursday’s count was two vessels — both tankers, both in ballast, both ENTERING the Gulf. That is the directional signal we said to watch (empty, load-bound tankers returning) registering for the first time — but at a scale of two it is a flicker, not a recovery, and it is inbound positioning, not exports. Early Saturday 1 August a tanker was disabled by an unknown projectile about 11 nautical miles north-east of Limah, Oman, near the strait’s entrance — engine room damaged, the vessel “not under command”, with no casualties or pollution initially reported (UKMTO); its identity, cargo and the party responsible have not been disclosed, and we do not attribute the attack. The IRGC claimed on Friday it had hit or stopped two tankers and turned four back — claims Reuters could not independently confirm — while tracking data showed two laden VLCCs and two other commodity vessels transiting successfully. The honest framing: Hormuz is permitting, or failing to prevent, individual passages. It has not returned to normal commercial navigation. A second weekend incident underlines it: on Saturday the master of another tanker reported a large splash and explosion close to the vessel about 21 nautical miles north-west of Khasab (UKMTO) — no damage or casualties, attacker and weapon unidentified. A diplomatic pause can stop a bombing campaign; it does not immediately remove mines, projectiles, armed boats or insurer reluctance from the water. Movement without normalisation continues: two laden VLCCs carrying Saudi and Iraqi crude exited the Gulf late last week. Some barrels are finding passage; the route has not returned to reliable pre-war capacity. Physical evidence that the US blockade is biting arrived Wednesday: some 50 laden Iranian tankers — mostly crude, plus fuels and LPG — were idling along Iran’s coast in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman as of Tuesday, according to advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran, up from 45 a week earlier and 36 when the blockade was renewed on 14 July. UANI says it has tracked no laden Iranian crude tanker successfully exiting the Gulf of Oman without encountering US enforcement since then — though transponder-off departures are possible — and the blockade also stops empty ships returning for fresh loadings, while LPG and product cargoes continue to load on smaller vessels that may try to run it. Traders told Bloomberg fresh Iranian crude offers have gone scarce, with sellers holding cargoes and Iranian Light offered around $4 under ICE Brent, narrowed from about $5. Iranian crude in floating storage has climbed 14% in a month to 135 million barrels (Vortexa), swelling in the Yellow Sea, off peninsular Malaysia and near Sri Lanka — a finite pool outside the Gulf that matters more the longer the blockade holds, while the Shandong teapot refiners who buy most of it run at about 48% of capacity against a roughly 60% seasonal norm (Mysteel OilChem). · UPDATE 9 AUGUST — REOPENING IS NOT AGREED. Read this line before any headline saying a deal is close. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said the Iran–Oman shipping-lane agreement is in its FINAL STAGES, but that it would NOT BY ITSELF reopen the Strait; he said reopening also depends on other US actions, including compensation for attacks on Iran. Separately, the IRGC said the Strait would reopen when Washington accepts Iran’s conditions, and Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, secretary of Iran’s top national-security body, listed broader demands including lifting sanctions and the blockade and ending attacks on Iran and its regional allies. Those are three different speakers making three different claims and we do not merge them. Current position — Hormuz reopening: NOT AGREED. Iran–Oman shipping lanes: final stages, per Araqchi. Reopening conditions: unresolved. Brent settled $83.55 on Friday 7 August, up 1.3%, with Gulf markets awaiting clarity (Reuters). A lane design is not an opening; the lanes describe WHERE ships would go if the strait reopened, not WHETHER it will. · UPDATE 11 AUGUST — THE THROUGHPUT WENT DOWN, NOT UP. Barclays estimates combined crude and refined-product NET EXPORTS through the Strait averaged just 3.0 mb/d in the week ending 7 August, down from 4.4 mb/d the week before. That is the number to hold against the diplomatic headlines: while the corridor design advanced towards "final stages", the barrels actually moving through the strait FELL by roughly a third. The talks themselves then stalled — Iran says they are deadlocked, listing the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of Iranian assets among its conditions for fully reopening, while President Trump told Axios on Sunday that the US is "only semi-negotiating". Oil rose about 5% on Monday in response. Current position unchanged and now with physical evidence behind it — Hormuz reopening: NOT AGREED, and throughput moving in the wrong direction. · UPDATE 12 AUGUST — THE OFFICIAL NUMBER AND THE OBSERVED NUMBER HAVE SEPARATED. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said Middle East oil exports rose above pre-war levels on Sunday and have been “right around normal” for a week, putting Hormuz flows at about 9 mb/d. The observable data does not support that. Kpler counted 84 vessel transits through the strait in the WHOLE of last week — nine of them on Sunday — against more than 100 transits a DAY before the war, and recorded six vessels on Monday against a ten-day average near eleven. Matt Smith, Kpler’s director of commodity research: “It is not possible to reconcile the disparity between what we see and what he is quoting.” JPMorgan puts crude actually leaving the strait nearer 4 mb/d (CNN Business), and Barclays’ 3.0 mb/d combined crude-and-product net-export estimate for the week ending 7 August points the same way. Part of the gap is real but invisible rather than absent: EU Sentinel-2 imagery caught twelve ship-to-ship transfers on Monday 10 August along more than 100km of the Omani and Emirati coasts, and at least four outbound VLCCs carrying 8 million barrels reappeared on tracking after crossing dark since 8 August (Bloomberg). That shuttling is a genuine lifeline restraining prices — but it is adaptation, not normalisation, and it concentrates enormous cargo value into a small patch of water where ships are being shot at. The shooting has not stopped for the talking: an ADNOC tanker was struck by a missile in the strait on 8 August, which the UAE and the GCC blamed on Iran and Abu Dhabi called piracy by the IRGC; ADNOC says fifteen of its vessels have been attacked since the conflict began, three of them that week, killing one crew member and injuring twenty (Al Jazeera). Meanwhile the diplomacy has split cleanly in two: Iran and Oman have settled the COORDINATES of a safe corridor, while Iran conditions actual reopening on the US ending the war, withdrawing troops and paying compensation, and Araghchi denies negotiations with Washington are under way (NBC News). Check any “Hormuz deal” headline against which track it belongs to. The market is pricing the official story more closely than the physical one — Brent near $89, WTI near $84 — which is precisely the condition in which a supply shock reprices abruptly. · UPDATE 12 AUGUST — THE CLAIM HARDENS AS THE ENFORCEMENT TALLY GROWS. President Trump said the US has “total control over the Hormuz Strait… We own it” (Joint Base Andrews, Tuesday evening), while Energy Secretary Wright posted that the seven-day average for oil leaving Hormuz is almost 9 mb/d. Against that: Kpler’s 84 transits for the whole of last week, JPMorgan’s ~4 mb/d, and Barclays’ 3.0 mb/d net exports for w/e 7 Aug. Wendy Sherman, former US deputy secretary of state, on Bloomberg TV: “definitely at a stalemate… for the foreseeable future, if not forever, Iran will control the Strait of Hormuz.” Meanwhile CENTCOM disabled the Panama-flagged M/V Vela Nova in the Gulf of Oman on Tuesday, an MH-60 firing two Hellfire missiles into its engine room after warnings were ignored; 17 crew safe. That was the twelfth vessel attacked by US forces since April and the third since the blockade was reimposed on 14 July, with 55 commercial vessels redirected, three disabled and two boarded in total. NOTE THE FRAMING CORRECTION THIS FORCES: thin traffic around Hormuz is not solely Iranian interdiction — a material share is US blockade enforcement, and that part is Washington’s to lift. Diplomacy has added a third channel, Pakistan (Sharif, Munir and Dar; defence minister Khawaja Asif says the sides are “close to some sort of arrangement”), while Iran’s newly appointed SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaee insists an Oman deal is separate from reopening. Both sides now demand compensation from the other. Current position unchanged — Hormuz reopening: NOT AGREED. · UPDATE — TRAFFIC DID NOT RECOVER, WEEK TO 9 AUGUST. Lloyd’s List Intelligence recorded 78 Hormuz transits in the week 3–9 August, down from 95 the week before — a fall of about 18%. Read that as further deterioration from an already depressed level, not a fresh collapse. Two limits matter. It counts ALL vessel transits, not oil-tanker movements and not exported barrels, so it is not comparable with the PortWatch tanker series we publish elsewhere on this site and the two must not be spliced together. And the directional split reported alongside it — outbound down about 30%, inbound down about 6% — does not sit easily with Lloyd’s List Intelligence’s own brief for the same week, which describes non-Iranian inbound transits as modestly elevated for a second consecutive week. The two may be counting different vessel populations; we report both and merge neither. Against that traffic backdrop, the newly appointed head of Iran’s Basij said the strait is “under Iran’s control and management”, a day after Washington asserted control of its own. Competing declarations of authority are evidence that the passage regime is contested, not evidence that either party physically controls the water — and the transit counts say what neither declaration does: ships are still not moving through in normal numbers. · UPDATE 15 AUGUST — NEAR-STANDSTILL, AND NO VISIBLE CRUDE. The deterioration has gone further. Kpler observed just TWO vessel crossings on Friday 14 August, against nine on Thursday and five on Wednesday, with an August daily average of about 12 — set against pre-war traffic above 130 vessels a day. On Friday NO CRUDE-OIL SHIPMENTS were visible at all. Read that precisely: AIS-dark crossings remain possible, so zero visible crude is not the same as zero physical crude, and this is an observation of what can be seen rather than a census of what moved. The security picture deteriorated alongside it. Two ADNOC vessels were attacked on Thursday and a third on Friday — three ADNOC incidents in under a week — while UKMTO separately reported a bulk carrier struck by an unidentified projectile on Friday, its crew reported safe. Iran maintains that passage remains subject to its permission, and peace negotiations remain halted. Unlike the 18% weekly fall reported for the week to 9 August, this is absolute daily counts rather than a percentage — and the direction is now a near-standstill rather than a depressed plateau (Reuters/Kpler; UKMTO). · 17 August update: Kpler recorded five commodity-vessel transits on Saturday 15 August and none on Sunday 16 August, versus 31 during the preceding weekend. Reuters cautions that vessels may pass undetected with their transponders disabled. These figures remain a tracking-observed floor, not a measurement of total oil throughput. The covert shuttle evidence explains part of that measurement boundary but does not verify the disputed aggregate flow estimates. State unchanged; direction remains deteriorating. · 24 August update: two measurements now point in different directions and the distinction matters. Lloyd’s List Intelligence recorded 73 transits in the week to 16 August, of which 43 were not Iranian-linked — against 60 non-Iranian-linked the previous week and a weekly average of about 37 since April. On overlapping dates Reuters reported daily commodity-ship counts still in single digits, with seven crossing on Thursday 21 August, none of them VLCCs or LNG carriers. These are NOT contradictory readings: a weekly all-vessel count and a daily commodity-vessel count measure different populations, and the gap between them is the same measurement boundary this ledger has flagged since the covert-shuttle evidence. Treat any single figure describing ‘Hormuz traffic’ as under-specified until its population is stated. What has not improved is the security and negotiation track: a seafarer was killed when a bulk carrier was struck this week, with no group claiming responsibility, and US–Iran talks remain in limbo. Cargo continues to reroute via Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Oman and the Jeddah land bridge, with ship-to-ship transfer off Oman and Fujairah feeding long-haul vessels (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 19 August 2026; Reuters, 20–21 August 2026). State unchanged. Direction is now SPLIT and should not be collapsed into a single label: deteriorating on security and negotiations, while observed transit counts have risen from the mid-August trough. The board’s direction field continues to track the security line. UPDATE 25 Aug 2026: three counts now describe this strait and they are not interchangeable — Lloyd’s List Intelligence’s 73 all-vessel transits in the week to 16 August, Reuters’ seven commodity ships on 21 August, and IMF PortWatch’s satellite-AIS seven-day average of 3.6 vessels a day to 16 August (about 4% of its 2023 baseline). Different populations, windows and methods; any single ‘Hormuz traffic’ figure is under-specified until it states which one it means. The security track deteriorated again: at 01:31 UTC on 25 August an oil tanker was reported struck by an unknown projectile nine nautical miles north-east of Ash Shishah, Oman, damaging the engine room and disabling the vessel, crew reported safe, with no claim of responsibility — and no attribution is made here. Recorded from Arab News and TradeWinds attributing UKMTO, 25 August 2026; the agency’s own advisory page was not reachable to us, so this is not first-hand sourcing. On 24 August the US announced its toughest Iran sanctions package to date, Iran having warned beforehand that it could seize ships in the strait; Brent nonetheless settled near $92, down about 2.5% (CNBC, 24 August 2026). The price track and the physical track moved in opposite directions on the same day. TotalEnergies’ Patrick Pouyanné supplied the mechanism behind the crude–product split at a Stavanger conference on 24 August: roughly $10/bbl of extra transit cost spread over a 2-million-barrel VLCC, against his estimate of a ‘$50 a barrel surcharge for transport’ on refined products and his assertion that ‘you don’t have a single tanker of products moving out of Hormuz’ (Reuters via Zawya, 24 August 2026). Both are recorded as his estimate and his characterisation: $20m spread over a 300,000–350,000-barrel product cargo would imply roughly $57–$67/bbl, so the $50 is not a transposition of his own crude arithmetic, and no independent comprehensive product-tanker count has been published to support the ‘not a single tanker’ claim. State unchanged; direction remains SPLIT. UPDATE 1 Sep 2026: the declarations have not produced traffic. Kpler data reported by Reuters put Monday 31 August at about five commodity vessels — four entries and one exit — against a ten-day average near 14, with NO liquid tankers among them; the arrivals were one empty handy-sized gas tanker routed via Iranian waters and three laden dry bulk carriers (Al-Monitor carrying Reuters, 1 September 2026). This SUPERSEDES the ten-vessel reading for 26 August recorded above: a lower count and a worse mix. The exclusion of transponder-off vessels still applies, so it stays a floor rather than total throughput. Security deteriorated in step: after US strikes on Larak launchers on 30 August and Iranian fire on US positions in Jordan, UKMTO reported on 1 September that a tanker leaving the strait had been struck by three projectiles at about 20:00 UTC the previous evening, 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman, with no casualties or environmental effects and the vessel unidentified. Recorded from Arab News and CNBC attributing UKMTO, not from the agency’s own advisory, which remains unreachable to us; no group has claimed responsibility and no attribution is made here. The market response is the week’s real development: Brent climbed back above $91 on 1 September — $91.76 on our feed at 07:50 UTC against Monday’s $90.49 settle, up 1.4% — while Japan’s ten-year yield touched 3% for the first time since 1996 and the US ten-year reached about 4.78% intraday, its highest since January 2025, after a 4.72% close on Monday. CORRECTION, same day: intermediate readings of $88.79 and $89.31 recorded here earlier were artefacts of our own feed, not market moves — Stooq was returning 404 all session and the Yahoo fallback served stale prints ($89.31 is 28 August’s close). The round-trip narrative built on them has been withdrawn. State unchanged; direction remains SPLIT. 10 September update. CENTCOM says it destroyed five Iranian crude carriers on 8 September — Kaviz, Charminar, Horizon 1, Riesco and Derya — four in the Gulf of Oman and one near Kharg Island, stating the strikes answered two IRGC ballistic-missile attempts against a US warship over the preceding two days, that the warship evaded both, and that crews were instructed to abandon the vessels before they were struck. CENTCOM describes the ships as part of a shadow network financing the IRGC; Riesco was filmed burning and sinking. Iran claims retaliatory attacks on US-linked vessels in the strait; those claims are unverified. Kpler’s 10-day average for early September is about 13 transits a day against an ~85/day pre-crisis baseline, with single-day counts of five to eleven; vessel-tracking estimates remain well below higher US official figures (Al Jazeera, 3 September 2026). Bunkering: extreme June spot premiums have moderated materially — VLSFO spot premiums reached $500–700/t against front-month Singapore cargo values, against a $10–20/t norm — but physical availability remains constrained, with major grades still described as super tight and fuel-oil imports falling sharply (ENGINE, 8 September 2026). The 5 September watch condition — whether the threat against Iran’s wider oil fleet would be executed — has now fired. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · UPDATE 20 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 18 September) — CROSSINGS STILL IN SINGLE FIGURES ON EVERY MEASURE; SAUDI SPOT BARRELS TRANSIT THE STRAIT ON SAUDI ACCOUNT FOR SHIP-TO-SHIP LIFTING OFF OMAN. Two providers give two counts for 16 September and they are not reconciled here. Reuters ship-tracking counted three commercial vessels through the strait (Reuters, 17 September 2026). Windward’s maritime intelligence centre, which also uses satellite imagery, recorded 12 transits — twice the six it logged the day before — and states that 11 of the 12 ran without AIS; it names three vessels that broadcast throughout (the bulk carrier Theodore, the bitumen tanker AB Victory and the LPG carrier Mor Gas), two that went dark mid-transit, and at least two further dark transits detected by imagery (Windward Daily Intelligence, 16 September 2026). Windward’s own sub-counts do not sum on a single basis on our reading and are reported as published. Different providers, different methods; every count here is a floor on movement and none is a volume. SEPARATELY AND NOT COMPARABLE: our own IMF PortWatch series — a different provider, geofence and baseline, never combined with, averaged with or divided into the tracking counts above — recorded 8 transits on 13 September and a 7-day average of 5.3 a day against its 2023 baseline of 92.3 (6%). Saudi Arabia has sold about 60 million barrels of crude loading at Ras Tanura, inside the Gulf, for ship-to-ship transfer at Sohar in September and October, with Chinese, South Korean, Indian and Japanese refiners the buyers; a buyer told Reuters the oil “passes through the Strait of Hormuz at Saudi Arabia’s risk before being transferred to us outside the gulf” (Reuters, via Baird Maritime, 18 September 2026). The transfer changes who carries the risk of the transit; it is not evidence that barrels bypass the strait. Bloomberg separately reported about 20 million barrels of spot crude sold to Asian refiners for loading outside Hormuz (Bloomberg, via OilPrice, 16 September 2026). MARAD advisory 2026-011 (Iranian attacks on commercial vessels — Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman) remains in force and expires 8 March 2027 unless renewed. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · UPDATE 30 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 29 September) — STRIKES CONTINUE, TRAFFIC STAYS A FLOOR, NO REOPENING. This append also enters facts shown on the board on 24–25 September that had not been recorded in this ledger. ATTACKS: the Liberia-flagged LPG carrier Al Maryah was struck outbound on Sunday 20 September and the Isle of Man-flagged crude tanker LR Stephanie entering on Monday 21 September; UKMTO reported two crew with minor injuries on LR Stephanie and both vessels continued under their own power (Reuters via Investing.com, 22 September 2026; Riviera Maritime Media, 21 September 2026). On 23 September the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged bulk carrier Cape Dao was struck about 2.5 nautical miles off Musandam at around 0630 UTC and left on fire and adrift; Indian seafarer Suraj Yadav, 26, was killed (gCaptain, 23 September 2026, citing UKMTO; a seafarers’ union says the ship was struck twice). On the evening of 28 September the Kuwaiti VLCC Al Funtas was struck in the strait; the fire was extinguished and she was again underway, extent of damage not known; the IMO now counts 86 confirmed incidents in the Gulf area and 24 deaths (Maritime Executive, 29 September 2026). An Iranian cruise-missile strike on 14 September that injured eight US Marines aboard a non-Navy vessel was disclosed on 27 September (NBC News, 27 September 2026). TRAFFIC — providers kept separate and never combined: our own IMF PortWatch series recorded 1 transit on 27 September and a 7-day average of 3.1 a day, 3% of its 2023 baseline of 92.3 (tankers 1.3 a day); Kpler counted two commodity vessels on 21 September, down from ten the day before, excluding AIS-dark crossings (Reuters, 22 September 2026); Lloyd’s List Intelligence tracked at least 92 non-Iranian-linked transits in 14–20 September against 102 the week before, figures it expects to rise as dark transits are verified (LLI Strait of Hormuz Brief, 24 September 2026); MarineTraffic data cited by Al Jazeera counted 132 transits in 21–27 September against 116 the week before, and Kpler put September crude through the strait at about 7.4 million b/d (Al Jazeera, 28 September 2026). US officials’ escort figures are claims, not measurements, and are not recorded as flows. Every count here is a floor on movement, not throughput. DIPLOMACY: Iran’s seven-day reopening plan was rejected by President Trump on 26 September — see the Middle East conflict row; no reopening is agreed. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating.

The war has crossed into US fatalities and Gulf oil infrastructure. An Iranian strike on a base in Jordan killed two US service members (one missing) — the first American deaths since March, taking the toll to 16 killed and 430+ wounded — and a further service member has since reportedly died in Iraq during the controlled detonation of a downed Iranian drone. The US has now run thirteen consecutive nights of strikes on command centres, air defences, coastal surveillance, launch sites and communications networks; Iran has answered with attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait. Iran’s barrage on Kuwait widened to an offshore Kuwait Oil Company drilling platform, border posts and the airport, on top of the KPC oil facility already hit (IRGC: "15th wave of Operation Nasr 2"). Saudi Arabia issued shelter warnings for Al-Kharj and Yanbu — reportedly an Iranian missile, the first on the kingdom in three months, though Riyadh has not confirmed the cause and the danger later passed. No confirmed strike on Yanbu itself — the Red Sea bypass — but its appearance in the target set is the escalation to watch. Through Sunday 26 July the US paused its strikes on Iran after thirteen consecutive nights, and no Iranian attacks on Gulf states were reported over the weekend. Washington says its naval blockade remains in force, and Trump is reportedly holding back while a China-initiated diplomatic effort continues: a political opening, not yet a ceasefire or a reopened route. Into Monday 27 July the pause held for a second consecutive day and Iran said it would hold its fire as long as the US did, with Oman and other intermediaries working to restore the interim ceasefire framework and negotiate Hormuz shipping arrangements — but the nuclear dispute is unresolved, the naval blockade still operates, and Tehran still asserts authority over strait movements. By 28–29 July the lull had broken. Saudi Arabia said its armed forces, coordinating with US Central Command, carried out joint strikes on Iran-backed groups in eastern Iraq after drones launched from Iraqi territory targeted oil facilities in the kingdom’s Eastern Province — Saudi air defences intercepted those drones and no damage to the facilities has been reported (a separate event from the Houthi strikes near Jizan on 24–25 July). CENTCOM said the groups were behind more than 30 drone attacks in 72 hours on US forces and Saudi energy infrastructure; Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces said several of its headquarters were struck, reporting casualties. Iran denied involvement and Iraq ordered an investigation (Reuters). The US military separately said it intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles aimed at American forces, and Tehran rejected an Omani proposal for regional management of the strait. Reuters has since confirmed the detail: Washington and Riyadh both said they jointly struck the Iran-backed groups in retaliation for drone attacks on Saudi oil targets launched from Iraq — the first US airstrikes in the region since Trump suspended the bombing campaign after 13 days, and the first time Saudi Arabia has publicly declared participation in joint strikes, drawing the kingdom into direct combat against Iran’s proxies on a new front. Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces said at least 20 of its members were killed and 32 wounded across several bases; Baghdad called an emergency meeting. Jordan said its air defences shot down five Iranian missiles — three of the four US service members killed this month died in Jordan. The two-day pause was a lull, not a settlement. The threat geography has also widened: Reuters reports regional assessments that some recent attacks on Saudi Arabia — including on oil installations in the Eastern Province, the heartland of Saudi crude production — were launched from Iraq, with Houthi personnel working alongside Iraqi Iran-aligned armed groups. That adds a third launch axis (Iran toward the Gulf, Yemen toward the south-west, now Iraq toward the Eastern Province) and puts Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Jubail and the East–West pipeline pumping stations inside a wider threat envelope. Late Friday, Reuters — citing a CBS News report — said the United States and Israel are planning a possible bombing campaign against energy-related targets inside Iran, potentially this weekend and with discussion of completing it before financial markets reopen on Monday. President Trump had NOT given final approval when the report was published, and which targets “energy-related” covers is unspecified. This is reported planning, not a completed operation — but it would be the most consequential escalation since the renewed attacks began, and no new Iranian fixed energy facility has been verified hit as of Saturday morning. It then did not happen: President Trump says he has cancelled or postponed the planned attack while Middle Eastern governments try to complete a deal covering Iran’s nuclear programme and the “immediate, complete and total” reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Israel is said to have joined the commitment; Iran has not publicly accepted the terms — a negotiating pause, not yet a ceasefire or a reopened strait. Gulf capitals reportedly pressed Washington not to escalate, fearing retaliation against Saudi and Emirati oilfields and Qatar’s gas installations — a threat Iranian security-linked media made explicitly on Saturday, though it remains a threat, not an attack. Iranian drones did reach Kuwait: Kuwait says it destroyed drones targeting “vital facilities”, with material damage to a government facility in the north and company property on Bubiyan Island and no casualties — the nature of the installations has not been disclosed, and we do not describe them as oil or gas sites. Monday brought the contradiction: Trump said negotiations would take place that day, but Iran’s Foreign Ministry said no negotiations with the United States are taking place. Tehran confirmed only discussions with Oman over temporary safe passage through Hormuz, insisting the strait cannot return to normal while US military action continues. Oil fell nearly 6% anyway — the market pricing talks that one side says are not happening. Tuesday added the material constraint beneath the diplomacy: Reuters reports, citing three people familiar with internal data, that the US Army has used ‘virtually all’ of its long-range ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles in five months of war — CENTCOM has been able to reload from US stocks elsewhere in the world — that roughly 65% of Patriot interceptors and at least 38% of THAAD interceptors have been expended (CSIS estimates that two sources say match internal figures), and that a little under half the global Tomahawk supply has been used (one source; Reuters could not independently verify that number). The White House says the US has ‘far more munitions than anyone in the world’ and the Pentagon disputes any readiness gap. Two explanations now circulate for why the next offensive was shelved — stockpile warnings from military advisers, per several outlets, or Gulf-state pressure, per a US official — and they are not mutually exclusive. The depletion cuts both ways for oil: it pushes Washington toward de-escalation, but it also thins the Patriot and THAAD shield that Gulf oil infrastructure has sheltered behind for five months. By Wednesday 5 August the diplomacy had firmed a notch: Qatar said a draft proposal for an interim deal to free up shipping through Hormuz had been prepared, and Bloomberg reported both US and Iranian officials sounding optimistic about reopening the waterway — a drafted text, not a signed one, and it comes a day after Tehran denied that any US–Iran negotiations were under way. Oil extended its slide on the news, with WTI below $75 and Brent below $79 by Wednesday morning. 10 September update. The August negotiating pause no longer describes the conflict. Renewed direct Saudi–Houthi exchange materially expands the active conflict: Saudi airstrikes across Yemen have drawn Houthi drone and missile retaliation against Saudi energy infrastructure, and the Houthis say seven were killed in a Saudi strike on a Yemeni prison (Times of Israel, September 2026). CENTCOM’s reported destruction of five Iranian crude carriers on 8 September, following IRGC missile attempts against a US warship, extends direct US–Iran exchange to oil-export logistics. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · UPDATE 20 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 18 September) — THE CONFLICT NOW INCLUDES DRONE STRIKES FROM IRAQI TERRITORY ON SAUDI ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack on the East-West pipeline by “several drones coming from Iraq” on 10–11 September, said it would not retaliate for now at Baghdad’s request while reserving the right to take all necessary measures to protect its facilities, and Iraq’s Prime Minister’s Office said on 13 September that a military commander in Maysan governorate had been dismissed after investigators confirmed the launches came from that province (Al Jazeera, 11 and 13 September 2026; Euronews, 12 September 2026). This widens the conflict’s geography — Iraq-based launches against the kingdom’s principal Hormuz bypass — alongside the Saudi–Houthi exchange and the US–Iran strikes on oil-export logistics recorded on 10 September. The pipeline’s operational status is carried in the Red Sea row; this row records the political facts: Riyadh has named Iraq as the launch territory and has chosen not to retaliate for now. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · 20 SEPTEMBER, LATER (evidence of 19 September) — FIRST HOUTHI MISSILE AT RIYADH SINCE THE WAR REIGNITED. Saudi air defences intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at the capital in the early hours of 19 September; the Houthis said they targeted Riyadh and Yanbu in response to Saudi strikes on Sana’a, the Saudi-led coalition said attempts against Bisha, Taif, Farasan and Yanbu were thwarted, and the United States issued a fresh travel warning for the kingdom (Financial Times, 19–20 September 2026; Al Jazeera, 19 September 2026; AP via NPR and the Washington Post, 19 September 2026). The Houthis’ ten-day escalation — missile and drone attacks on the kingdom while advancing along Yemen’s Red Sea coast toward Bab al-Mandeb — now reaches the capital. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · UPDATE 30 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 29 September) — IRAN’S SEVEN-DAY PLAN REJECTED; TALKS CONTINUE THROUGH QATAR; NO CEASEFIRE. This append also enters facts shown on the board on 25 September that had not been recorded in this ledger. On 22 September Iran said it could reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the United States eased military pressure and began lifting its blockade of Iranian ports, a proposal it said had already been delivered to Washington through mediators (Iran International, 22 September 2026, citing Reuters and Kyodo). On 25 September Foreign Minister Araghchi set out the plan at the UN General Assembly: the strait would be open at the end of the seventh day and talks would restart, conditional on lifting the blockade, waiving oil sanctions and a ceasefire that includes Lebanon (Euronews, 25 September 2026). President Trump rejected it on 26 September — “I’m rejecting their deal” — and said on 27 September that he expects talks to resume (CBS News live updates, 26–27 September 2026). On 28–29 September Araghchi met Qatari mediators in New York; a US official said the sides “still remain apart on the timing of the commitments”; there is no ceasefire (Al Jazeera, 29 September 2026). On the water, strikes on shipping continued through 28 September and the injury of eight US Marines on 14 September was disclosed on 27 September — see the Hormuz row. On 24 September the Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted six ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and Yanbu; the Houthis claimed strikes on a sensitive target in Riyadh and on Aramco facilities at Yanbu (Al Jazeera, 24 September 2026). MARAD’s advisory list, as ingested by this site on 29 September, carries nine advisories, including 2026-011 (Iranian attacks on commercial vessels, Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman) and 2026-013 (Houthi attacks, Red Sea to Somali Basin); the 25 September card’s “10 active advisories” is superseded by that count. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating.

Not confirmed closed, but the earlier "armed but not active" reading no longer holds. On 21 July the Houthis emailed shipowners warning that their embargo covers not just Saudi-flagged vessels but all ships calling at Saudi ports, which "may be subject to targeting" anywhere within reach of the Yemeni armed forces (Bloomberg). That directly threatens Yanbu — the Red Sea hub Saudi Arabia has leaned on, via its east–west pipeline, to keep crude moving while Hormuz is near-halted. A simultaneous Hormuz-and-Red-Sea disruption would hit the main Gulf route and its main alternative at once. It is already biting without a physical blockade: Reuters reported that at least three Saudi-crude tankers — the VLCCs Xin Long Yang and New Prime and the tanker Rodos — reversed course on 21 July rather than pass the Yemeni coast, diverting toward Suez, while war-risk insurance for Saudi-port callers repriced within 24 hours (Ambrey rates them high risk). A Saudi-led coalition says it has begun protective measures at Bab el-Mandeb, and Yanbu is still loading ships already inside the Red Sea or arriving via Suez — so this is rerouting and cost, not shutdown. Brokers note it could even push more Yanbu crude toward Europe on the shorter Suez/Med haul while lengthening Asia’s supply lines. JMIC tempers this: over 22–23 July it recorded Bab el-Mandeb traffic largely unchanged (85 transits in 48h) and had not yet observed operational enforcement of the blockade — the diversions so far are Saudi-linked cargoes, not a general halt. Routing is shifting even so: some product tankers are diverting north through Suez, and Saudi Aramco is offering additional crude from the Egyptian Mediterranean terminal of Sidi Kerir to bypass the threatened Red Sea leg (Reuters). Bloomberg adds a telling asymmetry: tankers linked to China and Russia keep crossing Bab el-Mandeb — some carrying Saudi crude — while Western owners increasingly avoid it, transit dark (the Greek Merbabu ran the strait with its transponder off, bound for India) or reroute; and a VLCC has been provisionally booked to load Egyptian crude for South Korea around the Cape of Good Hope, the first such fixture in years. And the campaign has moved onto fixed infrastructure: on 25 July Saudi air defences (Greek-operated Patriots) intercepted two ballistic missiles fired from Yemen at the Yanbu refineries, with alerts around Jizan and the ~400 kb/d Jazan complex, while the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi military and telecom sites in Hodeidah. On 25 July the Houthis then fired directly at Aramco installations at Jizan and Yanbu: Reuters-verified footage showed a column of smoke from the direction of the ~400 kb/d Jizan refinery and trading sources reported possible damage to fuel and oil storage there, though Aramco has confirmed no outage or production loss; the Yanbu-bound missiles were reportedly intercepted with no confirmed damage. The Houthis have declared a blockade of Saudi Arabia and warned that all its oil facilities could become targets — the war now reaching for the infrastructure built to bypass the war, not only tankers at sea. Then the traffic itself fell hard: only 11 commodity vessels crossed Bab el-Mandeb on Sunday 26 July (seven of them oil tankers), the lowest in months, though several large VLCCs carrying Saudi, Emirati and Russian crude still escaped south toward Asia — compression and selection under military pressure, not closure. A toll regime is now under consideration: regional sources told Reuters on 29 July that the Houthis are weighing fees on most traffic through Bab el-Mandeb, with no timeframe set — though on 31 July the Houthi-run maritime authority publicly denied plans to impose charges, describing its transit-coordination service as voluntary and free. The fee reports remain source-attributed and officially denied. Iranian advisers who returned with Houthi officials from Tehran are reported to be helping structure the authority that would levy them, and Chinese ships would be exempted — China, the largest buyer of Saudi crude, has held direct talks with the group to keep its tankers unharmed. The stated aims are to normalise charging for passage through an international waterway and to pressure Washington. A 2024 UN Panel of Experts report described earlier safe-passage payments it could not independently verify, estimated near $180m a month. The alternative is distance: roughly 16 days to Asia via Bab el-Mandeb against about 50 rerouting via Suez and southern Africa. The Jizan question has now resolved — the wrong way: the ~400 kb/d refinery was shut on 27 July after the Houthi attack, having exported more than 200 kb/d of fuels, mostly diesel and gasoil, over the prior three months — converting last week’s “no confirmed outage” into a confirmed product-supply loss. Traffic has improved without normalising: 25 commodity vessels crossed Bab el-Mandeb on Thursday 30 July (18 in, 7 out, including two VLCCs, a Suezmax and five Aframaxes), but the blockade threat stands and the counts are minimums — two Saudi crude tankers bound for India, carrying roughly 1 million and 700,000 barrels, ran the region with AIS off. And the strain is creeping toward the last detour: a drone struck two gas vessels at Egypt’s Damietta port on Wednesday, with no credible claim of responsibility yet, just as Kpler data cited by Reuters (30 July) showed Saudi SUMED loadings from Sidi Kerir at 28.79 million barrels for July, up from 19.52 million in April. Saul Kavonic of MST Marquee told Reuters that as much as ~5 mb/d of oil currently able to bypass Hormuz could be put at risk if the Red Sea/Suez route were also compromised. Two Saudi crude tankers moved through Bab el-Mandeb as the new week opened — positive for west-coast exports, but it neither removes the Houthi threat nor shows that insurers and shipowners regard the route as normal. · UPDATE 9 AUGUST — JAZAN HIT AGAIN, AND THIS IS THE ROUTE AROUND HORMUZ. The Houthis said they struck Saudi Aramco’s 400,000 b/d Jazan refinery on the Red Sea coast with a drone; military spokesman Yahya Saree said the strike was precise and framed it as a response to Saudi drone incursions over Saada and Hajjah. Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry separately confirmed a fire at the facility, said it was extinguished and reported no injuries — WITHOUT STATING A CAUSE. We do not write that Saudi Arabia confirmed a Houthi drone hit; the claim and the confirmation come from different parties and only the fire is officially established. The refinery had already been shut following the late-July attack. Why this matters beyond one more drone strike: Jazan sits on the Red Sea side of Saudi Arabia’s workaround to Hormuz — the corridor that lets Aramco move refined product without transiting the strait. The alternative route is now itself under attack while Hormuz remains constrained, and Reuters notes Houthi Red Sea activity is aggravating the existing global supply disruption. Reuters also reports the strike followed Saudi Arabia signing a defence pact. · UPDATE 11 AUGUST — THE RESTART SLIPS AGAIN. Aramco has pushed Jazan’s tentative restart from 15 August to 30 August following Sunday’s drone attack, according to an IIR note — a second delay for a 400,000 b/d complex that has been shut since 27 July and had been exporting more than 200 kb/d of fuels, mostly diesel and gasoil, in the three months before it stopped. Another fortnight of lost product supply lands on a market whose diesel margins jumped nearly 10% on Monday. · 17 August update: Reported September Saudi allocations expose a widening gap between the quoted crude price and the delivered cost. The price discount is calculated for loading at Ras Tanura inside the Persian Gulf, while buyers redirected to Yanbu or Sidi Kerir incur additional transfer, transit and rerouting costs. Traders said Japanese and South Korean refiners were asked to lift at Sidi Kerir, while Chinese, Taiwanese and Indian processors were directed to Yanbu; at least one refiner may decline its allocation because transporting it from Sidi Kerir around Africa to Asia would be uneconomic. The geographic split is consistent with differing route access and tolerance among shipowners, but that is an inference rather than a stated Aramco policy. This does not establish falling Saudi allocations or exports: volumes outside China were reportedly broadly consistent with recent months, no affected volume was disclosed, and Aramco declined to comment. Await September loading and destination data before drawing a physical-flow conclusion. · 24 August update: on Tuesday 18 August the Houthis CLAIMED a drone attack on Aramco’s Jazan refinery — reported as the third claim against that facility in roughly two weeks, and framed by a Houthi military source as a response to alleged Saudi violations of Yemeni airspace over Saada and Hajjah. Read the qualification: this is a CLAIM carried by the group’s own news agency and reported as unverified, not a confirmed strike or a confirmed outage. The restart date for the 400,000 b/d refinery remains 30 August, unchanged from the previous entry, so nothing yet indicates the claim has moved the timetable. The declared embargo on ships calling at Saudi ports stands. State unchanged; the pattern is repetition rather than escalation on the evidence available (Reuters/Saba, 18 August 2026; IIR restart date as previously recorded). 10 September update. Fighting between Houthi forces and Saudi-backed government forces has moved into the immediate approaches to Bab el-Mandeb. Reporting places the Houthis close to control of the coastal towns of Mocha and Dhubab, which sit directly on the strait, as part of a push along the Yemeni Red Sea coast; more than 300 people have been killed in days of fighting and hundreds of families displaced (Cyprus Mail, 10 September 2026; Al Jazeera, 8–9 September 2026). The UN envoy for Yemen has warned of a wider war. Separately, Houthi forces struck the Aramco refinery at Jazan and a bulk fuel plant with drones and missiles, claimed as retaliation for Saudi airstrikes in Yemen; the refinery was reported ablaze (TWZ; Al Jazeera). Any resulting outage duration is not yet established. The corridor’s strategic weight has risen because export routing displaced from Hormuz has made the Red Sea leg more important to Saudi barrels, so disruption here compounds rather than substitutes for Hormuz. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · UPDATE 20 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 18 September) — THE EAST-WEST PIPELINE IS OFFLINE; OCTOBER SAUDI CRUDE TO EUROPEAN TERM BUYERS IS SUSPENDED. Several drones “coming from Iraq” struck the East-West pipeline in the Riyadh and Madinah regions on 10–11 September, causing injuries and damage (Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, reported by Al Jazeera, 11 September 2026); Iraq’s Prime Minister’s Office said on 13 September that a commander in Maysan governorate had been dismissed after investigators confirmed the launches came from that province (Al Jazeera, 13 September 2026). Satellite imagery shows fire damage at pumping stations near Al Dhekra (10 September) and Al Mesba’ah (11 September) — at least two stations; Saudi Arabia has published no damage assessment (CNBC, Vantor imagery, 14 September 2026). The line had been carrying 4–5 million b/d to Yanbu before the attack, having become the kingdom’s main export route with Hormuz at a near-standstill (Bloomberg, 16 September 2026; OilPrice, 15 September 2026), so the fallback and the main route are impaired together — the compounding this row has warned of since July. Trading and shipping sources told Reuters on 15 September that some September-loading cargoes to European customers had been cancelled and Yanbu loadings suspended; Aramco declined to comment, and Reuters could not establish how many cargoes or for how long (Reuters, 15 September 2026). On 18 September Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the decision, that Aramco’s October suspension applies to all European term buyers; Reuters could not verify that scope but reported at least two European refiners told they would receive no October crude (Bloomberg, 18 September 2026; Reuters, 18 September 2026). THE ONLY RESTART ESTIMATE IS A PERSON FAMILIAR WITH THE MATTER CITED BY BLOOMBERG on 16 September — about half of capacity within days by bypassing the damaged section, full capacity in about six weeks; no Saudi official statement on timing has been found (Bloomberg, 16 September 2026). Poland’s Orlen, which takes about 40% of its crude from Aramco, said on 16 September it had bought 16 additional cargoes from Norway, Britain, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the Americas to cover through November — a contract, not yet a delivery (Reuters, 16 September 2026). State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · 20 SEPTEMBER, LATER (evidence of 19 September) — HOUTHIS CLAIM STRIKES ON YANBU; THE COALITION SAYS THEY WERE THWARTED. In the early hours of Saturday 19 September Saudi air defences intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh — the first Houthi attack on the capital since the war reignited, per the Financial Times — and the Houthis said their forces had targeted Riyadh and oil facilities at Yanbu, claiming “large fires at the targeted sites”; coalition spokesman Major-General Turki al-Maliki said attempts against Bisha, Taif, Farasan and Yanbu were thwarted, and Saudi authorities reported no damage from the Riyadh attempt, although firefighters extinguished a fire on an Aramco-branded fuel tank at a depot near Riyadh’s King Khalid airport and flights were disrupted (Financial Times, 19–20 September 2026; Al Jazeera, 19 September 2026; AP via NPR, 19 September 2026; France 24, 19 September 2026). Saudi authorities say dozens have been wounded in Houthi missile and drone attacks on the kingdom this month and that some oil operations in the south have been halted; the Houthis accuse Saudi Arabia of more than 300 air strikes in Yemen in a week (Financial Times, 20 September 2026). Yanbu — already suspended for loadings — is now a claimed target as well as an impaired terminal; no independent confirmation of damage at Yanbu has been found. State unchanged (critical); direction deteriorating. · UPDATE 30 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 29 September) — YANBU LOADINGS RESUME, AT ABOUT A THIRD OF THE PRE-ATTACK RATE. This append also enters facts shown on the board on 24–25 September that had not been recorded in this ledger. Saudi Arabia restarted the East–West pipeline on 22 September: three sources briefed on the matter said it was pumping at a low rate, Aramco was seeking to restore about 4 million b/d, and a security source said reaching 40% of capacity would take a couple of days and a full restart six to eight weeks (Reuters, 22 September 2026, via The Express Tribune and Arab News). On 24 September crude loadings into tankers had still not resumed at Yanbu — two ships due on 23 September did not load — and a return to full capacity was put at six weeks or more (Baird Maritime, 24 September 2026, citing Kpler). By 27 September loadings had resumed: satellite imagery showed nearly 10 million barrels being loaded at Yanbu and Al Muajjiz with 40 tankers visible (TankerTrackers.com); two trade sources put crude loadings at about 2 million b/d; Kpler expects 3–4 million b/d in the coming days and says a full return to the pre-attack rate of roughly 5.5 million b/d could take another month (MarineLink, 29 September 2026). Yanbu remains a target: on 24 September the Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted six ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and Yanbu, which the Houthis claimed as strikes on Aramco facilities at Yanbu; no damage was reported (Al Jazeera, 24 September 2026). No Houthi attack on Red Sea shipping was found for 23–29 September. No source found updates the October suspension to European term buyers. The pipeline’s attack and shutdown dates remain reported differently (attack 10–11 September; shutdown 11 or 13 September). State unchanged (critical). Direction held at deteriorating: the resumption restores about a third of the pre-attack rate and the terminal was targeted again on 24 September; if loadings reach the 3–4 million b/d Kpler projects, the next review should test a change.

Russian strikes overnight into 9 August damaged port infrastructure at Odesa and nearby Chornomorsk. Russia’s defence ministry said it had targeted fuel-storage facilities “used in the interests” of the Ukrainian military; local authorities said dozens of drones and missiles hit the city and about a dozen people were wounded. President Zelensky said Moscow was targeting global food security by striking Odesa’s seaport — that is HIS INTERPRETATION, reported as such, not a demonstrated consequence, and we do not present it as one. What is established: Odesa and Chornomorsk are among Ukraine’s main deep-water Black Sea export nodes for grain and oilseeds alongside Pivdennyi, and physical damage to that infrastructure is a logistics fact independent of how its downstream effect is characterised. Why it matters here: this is the energy–food–transport nexus in one event — fuel storage struck, port capacity degraded, and an export corridor that matters to buyers well beyond Ukraine. · UPDATE 15 AUGUST — A SECOND EXPORT ROUTE DISRUPTED, AND THE FLOWS ALREADY SHOW IT. Russia’s Sheskharis terminal at Novorossiysk suspended crude loadings after a drone attack. The terminal normally handles around 700,000 b/d; it stopped accepting incoming oil because storage was full, and one tanker left before loading. Duration is unknown, so treat 700,000 b/d as EXPOSED CAPACITY rather than a proven continuing supply loss. The downstream evidence is the stronger part, because it does not depend on any single strike: Turkey received 900,000 tonnes from Russian ports in July, down from 1.2 million tonnes in June, with Black Sea deliveries halving to slightly above 300,000 tonnes and August Black Sea arrivals currently projected near 200,000 tonnes. Turkey is substituting rare cargoes from Brazil and Guyana. Substitution on that scale is a physical-flow fact, and it is the part that matters for European product balances (Reuters). · RESOLVED 17 AUGUST — NOVOROSSIYSK RESUMED. The outage was short. Two trading sources tell Reuters the port resumed operations on Sunday 16 August, having halted loadings on Friday 14 August: a Suezmax has been loading Kazakh KEBCO crude since Sunday and was due to sail Monday, with a second tanker expected to start on 80,000 tonnes of KEBCO on Tuesday. The caution above was the right one — 700,000 b/d was exposed capacity, and the realised interruption was roughly two days, not a continuing supply loss. Two things survive the resumption. The terminal stopped accepting oil during the halt because its storage tanks had reached capacity, which is a real constraint signal rather than a detail. And the Turkish import decline is unaffected: it predates this strike and does not depend on it. Novorossiysk carries both Sheskharis and the CPC terminals, so it remains the single point through which landlocked Kazakhstan reaches world markets — the exposure is structural even when a given attack fails (Reuters, two trading sources). · 24 August review: NO MATERIAL CHANGE IDENTIFIED since 17 August. Searches across the 17–24 August window returned the same 12–16 August sequence this row already records — the 12 August drone attack, the Sheskharis suspension, and the resumption of crude loadings — and no later dated development. One detail surfaced that this row does not yet carry: reporting around the resumption described the port working at restricted capacity with only one berth in use. It is recorded here as UNCONFIRMED FOR THIS WINDOW because its publication date could not be placed after 17 August, and it is therefore not treated as a change of state. Turkey’s projected ~200,000 tonnes of August arrivals from Russian Black Sea ports is unchanged; separate reporting indicates the tankers scheduled carry Kazakh KEBCO, with no CPC Blend or Urals cargoes scheduled to Turkey for the month, which refines rather than revises the existing figure. This entry records a review with a negative finding, not a new assessment.

The crisis has escaped the Gulf. The CPC terminal on Russia’s Black Sea coast temporarily suspended crude loadings after attacks on vessels, forcing Kazakhstan to curtail production: Reuters reports output at the giant Tengiz field fell from about 925,000 to 406,000 b/d, and national oil-and-gas output dropped from roughly 2.07 to 1.63 million b/d. CPC carries more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s exported crude and handles about 2% of world oil supply — a physical loss of barrels on a major non-Gulf route, stacked on top of Hormuz and the Red Sea rather than an alternative to them. Kazakhstan said CPC loading operations resumed on Monday 27 July — but national oil and condensate output had dropped further, to about 1 million b/d on Sunday, less than half June’s ~2.16 million b/d average, so the export route may be restarting even as the production behind it has yet to recover. That restart did not hold: CPC suspended loadings again on Thursday 30 July after a further drone attack on a tanker — the second interruption in a week. The barrels matter to Europe specifically: much of this crude enters the Mediterranean and European refining system, and it is predominantly Kazakh, including volumes produced by Chevron and ExxonMobil, so the shorthand “Russian Black Sea terminal” understates who is actually affected.

Russia has assembled an unprecedented Arctic oil convoy: vessels carrying roughly 8 million barrels of crude were transiting the Northern Sea Route or staged to enter it on 3 August — about 60% of the ~13.1 million barrels moved across the whole of last year’s four-month season, just weeks into this one (gCaptain, MagicPort data). More than a dozen Suezmax, Aframax and MR tankers are involved, the largest group staging in the Kara Sea — likely awaiting nuclear-icebreaker escort or better ice — with three nuclear icebreakers (Sibir, Yakutiya and Ural) deployed along the route, Ural stationed at the recurring Wrangel Island bottleneck. This is the detours thesis in action: the NSR’s risks — ice, season, escort capacity — are largely uncorrelated with Hormuz, the Red Sea or Ukraine’s reach, and Moscow is maximising the window before ice closes much of the route in the autumn (the seasonal minimum comes in late September). The caveats sit in the row’s title: the corridor is seasonal, icebreaker-dependent, and now carries a concentration of value that did not exist a month ago. The corridor is now being pushed to its physical limit: nearly twenty tankers have been routed NORTH of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago through waters beyond 81 degrees north — within about 500 nautical miles of the North Pole — because difficult ice has persisted in the traditional Vilkitsky Strait gateway while the waters to its north opened up (gCaptain). Arctic shipping specialists say they cannot recall commercial traffic on this scale using the extreme northern passage; the Suezmax Dinasty may become the highest-latitude commercial vessel of its class ever recorded, and only four vessels on earth — all icebreakers or ice-class research ships — are currently operating farther north. The pace is unprecedented too: roughly the entire 13.1-million-barrel eastbound volume of last year’s four-month season has already departed in the opening weeks of this one. But the route’s risks are asserting themselves in step — the tanker Aria reversed course in the East Siberian Sea on 31 July, possibly on heavy ice ahead, and three nuclear icebreakers are deployed escorting the traffic. An escape corridor this crowded, this far north, this dependent on escort, is exactly what the end of the safe-detour ladder looks like.

Brent fell more than 6% on Monday 27 July to about $90.58 a barrel (WTI ~$83.51) after the US and Iran held fire for a second consecutive day and Oman pressed to restore a ceasefire framework — down from around $102 on 23 July, roughly $11 of war premium out in four sessions, lifting equities and bonds. But this is market de-escalation, not physical normalisation: physical crude cargoes in the Middle East, Europe and Africa hit two-month highs last week, and traders estimate roughly 10 mb/d of Middle Eastern crude and products is still missing or displaced from normal routes, only partly offset by longer voyages and Suez/SUMED workarounds. Oil is falling because the market believes the disruption can be managed — not because the disrupted barrels have returned. Dated Brent had reached about $105.70 and North Sea Forties $108.77 the week before; global refinery runs remain about 6 mb/d below a year ago (IEA), the deeper stress still in diesel and jet. Two things then changed. The physical premium collapsed rather than persisting: Argus assessments published by the Australian Institute of Petroleum show North Sea Dated falling from about $103/bbl on 24 July to roughly $93 on 27 July and about $86 on 28 July, broadly reconverging with the screen. And the relief proved short — Brent rebounded to about $86.79 and WTI to $81.91 (up roughly 3.3%) on 29 July as the strikes resumed. By 10:30 GMT the move had extended: Brent was up about 4.6% at almost $88 — the first rise since last week, after briefly spiking above $100 and then tumbling into the mid-$80s once the bombing pause emerged. Then it reversed hard again: after a low of $84.09 on Tuesday, Brent gained roughly 8% on Wednesday and added another 1.6% to about $92.22 by Thursday morning, with WTI near $84.89. Note the spread — about $7.3, up from under $5 a day earlier: waterborne Brent carries the Hormuz premium while landlocked WTI does not, so the widening gap is itself a measure of chokepoint risk. One analyst quoted by Reuters expects Brent to keep swinging broadly between $80 and $100 while the conflict repeatedly escalates and de-escalates. By Friday 31 July the screen had eased — Brent about $87.59, WTI near $82, still heading for a monthly gain of roughly 20% — while the product market set new extremes: European diesel refining margins at an all-time record $74.66/bbl, gasoline margins near four-year highs, jet above $80, and US diesel cracks at a record $93.44 (Valero reporting a record second quarter). Reuters’ framing is now the operative one: refining capacity may be as important a problem as crude scarcity. July closed with the war premium rebuilt: Brent settled Friday at $90.12 (up 1.2%) and WTI at $84.67 (up 1.3%) — monthly gains of 24% and 21% respectively, the sharpest of the crisis so far. The negotiating turn then took a large bite back: Brent fell about $4.65 to $83.28 and WTI roughly $5.20 to $79.47 on Monday morning, 3 August — a fall driven by expectations of talks, not by any physical restoration of Gulf exports. OPEC+ formally approved a ~188,000 b/d September increase for its eight core members, completing the rollback of the 1.65 mb/d voluntary-cut layer introduced in 2023 (an older ~2 mb/d cut runs to end-2026) — largely theoretical for now, since several producers sit below quota because war and shipping disruption stop available barrels reaching buyers. · UPDATE 11 AUGUST — THE PEACE DISCOUNT HAS BEEN GIVEN BACK, NOT EXCEEDED. ICE Brent front-month settled $79.36 on Tuesday 4 August as the market priced a reopening, then climbed for five straight sessions: $87.72 on Monday 10 August (+4.99%) and above $89 on Tuesday, around $89.25 (+1.75%). Read that as a ROUND TRIP rather than a breakout: on the same futures series Brent settled $90.12 on 31 July and peaked at $100.69 on 23 July, so roughly $89 today is about where the month ended and still some 11% below the July high. Crude has recovered the few days of reopening optimism and no more. (Separately, EIA’s Europe Brent Spot FOB assessment — a PHYSICAL price, not the screen — was $88.90 on 3 August against an $83.77 futures settle that day, so the physical premium has not fully gone away even though our Argus-based card has had no fresh print since 28 July.) The persistent deterioration is downstream, not in the crude screen: European diesel refining margins rose nearly 10% in a single session on Monday and US ULSD futures gained 7.4% to settle at $4.19/gal, their biggest rise since 13 July. Crude has gone roughly nowhere in a fortnight while the product market has kept tightening — the clearest statement yet that this is a conversion-and-delivery crisis rather than a crude-scarcity one. · UPDATE 30 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 29 September) — CRUDE ROSE THROUGH SEPTEMBER; THE PUMP RECORD HAS JUST EASED; PRODUCTS STAY TIGHTER THAN CRUDE. This row had no ledger append between 11 August and today: the board card was updated on 24 September without one. This append records the current position with sources and corrects that card. ICE Brent front-month (November) settled $103.08 on 23 September, up $3.83 from $99.25; $106.60 on 24 September; $104.32 on 25 September; and $102.59 on 29 September, heading for a monthly gain of about 13% (Reuters, 23, 24, 25 and 29 September 2026). WTI settled $92.16 on 23 September, up $1.64 (Reuters, 23 September 2026) — CORRECTION: the 24 September card gave $92.81, up $2.99, which matches neither Reuters nor this site’s own settled WTI series — and $89.38 on 29 September. The November Brent contract expires on 30 September; the next contract trades several dollars lower, so the front-month series will step down at the roll for mechanical reasons, which is not a market move. US retail diesel (EIA weekly on-highway average) set a record $6.529 a gallon in the week to 21 September and eased to $6.382 in the week to 28 September; regular gasoline was $4.465 (EIA Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, 28 September 2026). Refining margins remain extreme: Platts assessed the US Gulf Coast prompt pipeline ULSD crack against WTI at a record $102.187 a barrel on 10 September (Hellenic Shipping News, 15 September 2026), and Reuters reported a record US diesel crack of $118.62 on 14 September on a different calculation (Reuters via RTÉ, 21 September 2026) — the two series are not combined. State unchanged (critical).

The world’s largest emergency reserve is being drawn down while the crisis runs. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell another 3.8 million barrels to 307.7 million in the week ending 24 July (EIA) — the lowest since March 1983, down 95.1 million barrels (23.6%) on a year earlier — under the coordinated response in which Washington agreed to release 172 million barrels. This is not America running out of oil: the SPR is an emergency reserve, not the national supply, and dividing it by daily consumption produces a misleading countdown. It matters because it is the insurance against the NEXT disruption, and it is being spent while the commercial buffer falls too: official EIA data for the same week show commercial crude down 7.2 million barrels to 404.5 million (~6% below the five-year average; the API had suggested only −3.3M), gasoline essentially flat at 211.3 million (~7% below) and distillate up 1.1 million to 110.6 million (~10% below), with refineries at 97.2% of operable capacity (17.34 mb/d of inputs). Commercial plus strategic stocks together fell about 11 million barrels in one week, from 723.1 to 712.2 million. Pump prices show the strain: US regular gasoline about $4.096/gal and highway diesel about $5.313/gal, roughly 97 cents and $1.51 higher than a year ago. Commercial crude at 404.5 million barrels is also the lowest since 2018 — the buffer story now runs through both reserves at once. The refiners themselves say the squeeze lasts: ExxonMobil and Chevron warned late Friday that diesel and refined-product supplies are likely to stay tight through the second half of 2026 — even as Exxon reported record second-quarter diesel production and Chevron ran more than 1 million b/d through its US refineries, a company record. Running flat out is not the same as catching up, and plants cannot hold maximum utilisation indefinitely without maintenance.

Repeated Ukrainian strikes have forced Russian refineries to cut or suspend runs, and the campaign has widened geographically. Ukraine says its drones struck Lukoil’s Filanovsky platform in Russia’s largest Caspian oilfield and a refinery in Siberia’s Tyumen region more than 2,000 km away (regional authorities confirmed a drone-caused fire); no output loss is confirmed at either. The damage is now showing up domestically: Deputy PM Novak called fuel supply “quite difficult” in some regions, especially Siberia, Russia is extending its gasoline-export ban to end-2026 (the diesel ban to lift only as the home market recovers), and Russia is now receiving or arranging fuel from Kazakhstan, Belarus and India — a major crude producer importing fuel. Diesel and gasoil exports had already fallen to about 234,000 b/d in early July, against a 2025 average near 817,000 b/d (Kpler) — shortages, export bans and fuel imports now, not just refinery fires. Late July deepened it: the Ryazan refinery halted crude processing entirely after Wednesday’s drone attack, with industry sources telling Reuters the shutdown is expected to last about two weeks, and a strike on Lukoil’s Perm refinery forced unit CDU-5 offline — about 12,930 tonnes/day, roughly 34% of the plant’s capacity. Moscow’s response measures the severity: restrictions on exports of gasoline, diesel, marine fuel and gasoils have been extended to 31 January 2027 (producer exemptions for diesel, marine fuel and gasoils begin 1 September), citing the need to stabilise domestic supply after refinery attacks. A further drone attack set an unidentified energy facility and warehouses ablaze in the Volgograd region — Reuters has not confirmed that the refinery itself was struck (corrected 1 Aug from an earlier ‘refinery’ description). And the import map has widened again: Russia has taken delivery of roughly 30,000 tonnes of AI-92 petrol from Morocco, unloading at Murmansk, alongside supplies from India, Belarus and Kazakhstan, with petrol production at about 65% of normal summer consumption by early July (Reuters). One of the world’s largest oil producers is now importing petrol across four borders. Overnight into Sunday, Russia says it intercepted 635 Ukrainian drones; confirmed impacts include a distribution warehouse in Samara and civil infrastructure in Saratov and Engels, where two people were killed. Saratov hosts a major refinery, but Reuters has not confirmed the refinery itself was struck, and we do not conflate the city with the plant. Separately, President Zelensky said Ukrainian forces struck infrastructure at three refineries in Bashkortostan — Reuters reported the statement, and independent plant-by-plant damage assessments are still awaited. We do not report those refineries as stopped. Fuller reporting on that wave: Ukraine says its targets included the Saratov refinery, the Engels strategic-bomber airbase and a Kaluga oil depot, with fires reported around industrial facilities in Bashkortostan and at least eight deaths across several regions. Still no confirmed refinery shutdown or quantified processing loss from this wave — Saratov does not join the refinery-loss list until there is one. The campaign ran straight through the Middle East’s diplomatic opening. · UPDATE 11 AUGUST — THE DEEPEST STRIKE YET, AND THE DEADLIEST. Ukrainian drones hit the Taneco refinery at Nizhnekamsk in Tatarstan on 10 August, roughly 1,200 km from the border and among the longest-range blows of the war; Tatarstan’s authorities report 13 killed and 78 wounded, nine of them in a hostel. Ukraine says it struck the refinery and video showed it burning, but no plant-by-plant processing loss has been quantified and we do not list Taneco as stopped. Note the export-ban detail below, which is repeatedly reported loosely elsewhere: the GASOLINE ban runs outright to 31 January 2027, but the diesel, marine-fuel and gasoil restrictions carry PRODUCER EXEMPTIONS FROM 1 SEPTEMBER — so the diesel side of the ban loosens for refiners in under three weeks, and describing it as a flat diesel-export ban to January overstates the barrels removed.

The Russian collapse has pushed US diesel futures sharply higher and driven benchmark European diesel refining margins to an all-time record $74.66/bbl. European diesel inventories are at their thinnest since 2022, and total independently held product stocks in the Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp hub recently fell to their lowest since 2014 (corrected 1 Aug: an earlier version conflated the two measures), with Russia curbing diesel exports after refinery attacks and China also restricting fuel exports. India has become the emergency swing supplier — Reliance shipped roughly 4.2–5 million barrels of diesel to Europe in July, its highest in ten months — and in August Europe must compete with Asia for those Indian cargoes. Part of Kuwait’s 615 kb/d Al-Zour refinery is also down after a power failure. Diesel is the fast transmission channel into trucking, farming, mining, construction, shipping and backup power — product shortages can keep inflation rising even if crude stabilises. And the last mile is tightening too: low water on the Rhine (Kaub near its lowest since 1990) has pushed the cost of barging diesel inland from Rotterdam to its highest since 2009 (Bloomberg), so even landed product is harder to move to German and Swiss demand. · UPDATE 11 AUGUST — TWO REFINERY ATTACKS IN ONE WEEKEND, AND THE MARGIN MOVED IMMEDIATELY. European diesel refining margins rose nearly 10% on Monday 10 August and US ULSD futures gained 7.4% to settle at $4.19/gal, the biggest one-day rise since 13 July, after Ukraine struck the Taneco refinery at Nizhnekamsk in Tatarstan — one of Russia’s largest and most advanced plants, about 1,200 km inside Russia — and the Houthis hit Saudi Arabia’s Jazan refinery again. The Tatarstan strike carried a heavy civilian toll: regional authorities report 13 killed and 78 wounded, nine of the dead in a hostel, including citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Plant-level processing losses at Taneco are not yet quantified and we do not report it as stopped. Jazan’s restart has slipped again, from 15 August to 30 August (IIR). Our own gasoline-weighted Brent 3-2-1 proxy — not the diesel-only margin quoted above — sat at $49.28/bbl on 3 August, $27.78 higher than a year earlier; it runs on EIA spot data that lags about a week, so it PREDATES Monday’s move rather than capturing it. · UPDATE 30 SEPTEMBER (evidence through 30 September) — US STOCKS OFF THEIR LOW BUT SEASONALLY THIN; RUSSIA’S BAN FORMALLY EXTENDED; A US EXPORT CURB DEBATED, NOT DECIDED. This row had no ledger append between 11 August and today: the board card was updated on 24 September without one. This append records the current position with sources and corrects that card. US distillate stocks (EIA) rose from 103.4 million barrels in the week to 21 August to 107.9 million in the week to 11 September — which Reuters reported as the lowest for that time of year since records began in 1982 — then fell 0.4 million to 107.4 million in the week to 18 September, 12% below the five-year average (EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report, 23 September 2026; Reuters via RTÉ, 21 September 2026). CORRECTION: the 24 September card attached the “lowest seasonal level since 1982” to the 107.4 million reading; the source attaches it to the 11 September week. EIA’s September outlook forecast US distillate inventories “to fall below 100 million barrels in September and remain below the five-year (2021–2025) low through the end of 2026 and most of 2027” (EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, 9 September 2026); the weekly series had not fallen below 100 million as of the week to 18 September, and the week-to-25-September report, due 30 September, is not included here. Europe: Energy Aspects estimates a fourth-quarter European jet-fuel deficit of 510,000 b/d (Reuters, 20 September 2026); ARA jet stocks, at a seven-year low in the week to 10 September, rose 19.6% to 543,000 tonnes in the week to 17 September, with gasoil unchanged at 1.65 million tonnes (Insights Global via Investing.com, 17 September 2026). Russia formally extended its ban on diesel, marine fuel and gasoil exports by producers to 31 October; the ban for non-producers runs to 31 January 2027 (Interfax, 30 September 2026). United States: after Politico reported on 23 September that a 90-day diesel export ban was being prepared, the White House denied it; on 24 September the Energy Secretary was reported to have asked major refiners about voluntary export curbs; on 28 September the White House said “No policy decision has been made at this time” (Reuters, 23, 24 and 28 September 2026). State unchanged (critical).

Record low water is no longer only a freight story (Reuters, 31 Jul). Hungary’s Paks nuclear plant — nearly half the country’s electricity — shuts on Monday, possibly for weeks, because the Danube is too low to cool it safely; Romania’s Nuclearelectrica has shut one of its two Cernavodă reactors and is funding emergency water-routing work to keep the second online (the pair supply about a fifth of national needs); France has trimmed nuclear output on low, warm rivers. Serbia’s Djerdap 1 hydro plant is at 20% of capacity and low water has also cut its Kostolac coal units, with Belgrade and Budapest importing replacement power at high spot prices. Freight is squeezed in step: Rotterdam–Rhine cargo has fallen every week since early July to about 10% below normal — oil-product and chemical tankers hit hardest because they sit deepest — and Danube grain barges can only reach ports near the Black Sea. The bill is in company accounts: Verbund ~€370m H1 drought cost, EDF 2026 earnings outlook cut ~10%, A2A 3.9 TWh of hydro vs a 4.1 average. One Kpler analyst’s summary: either blackouts, or far more investment. The cascade reaches fuel directly — lost hydro and nuclear is replaced by gas Europe is struggling to store, and lost barge capacity moves to trucks burning the diesel Europe is shortest of. The escalation arrived within days: Hungary is shutting down the ENTIRE Paks plant — nearly half the country’s electricity, its first complete shutdown in 44 years — because the Danube can no longer supply enough cooling water, with PM Peter Magyar warning it could stay offline for weeks. Budapest is preparing voluntary and potentially mandatory cuts for large users, possible temporary disconnection of some industrial consumers, suspension of rail freight in peak evening hours, public-sector home-working, reduced public lighting and increased imports; Slovakia has offered help, and replacement power is estimated to cost hundreds of millions of dollars. By Tuesday 4 August the Rhine had fallen to its lowest level since records began in 1880: the barge clearance at Kaub touched 21cm overnight, forecasts point to 17cm by Saturday, and the river usually bottoms out later in the summer. The cost of shipping diesel from Rotterdam to Karlsruhe is the highest since Bloomberg began compiling the data in 2009; Shell has shifted deliveries from its Rhineland refinery to rail and truck, BASF reports supply bottlenecks, Evonik says production at its Marl chemical park is affected, and the Kiel Institute estimates a 0.1–0.2% hit to German GDP between July and September. Romania has gone beyond workarounds: its military detonated a rock formation in the Danube on Monday to redirect water toward the Cernavodă nuclear plant — the level at the plant rose 2cm instead of falling 2cm, the defence minister said. Scattered thunderstorms are possible, but dry soils will absorb much of any rain before it reaches the river; no lasting relief is in sight. The forecast has now confirmed it: this week’s rains — the first meaningful ones in weeks — will be sporadic and will largely miss the hardest-hit drought regions, with MetDesk calling them ‘still not enough rainfall to make much impact on the low river flows’ and the UK Met Office noting much of Britain’s rain will fall away from where it is needed (Bloomberg). Upper-Danube rain may stop levels falling sharply in the immediate term but will not restore flows there or on the Rhine. Vienna hit 40.8C on Tuesday — a national record for Austria — and central and south-eastern Europe runs 5–8C above normal this week, with ECMWF models pointing to high pressure rebuilding by early next week and potentially a fifth major heatwave of the summer. One tentative bright spot: MetDesk sees potential for cooler, wetter conditions in south-eastern Europe around mid-August, with abnormally warm Mediterranean waters possibly enhancing rainfall over the Balkans and Adriatic. Until then, the shipping, power and freight restrictions extend. Correction and update, 6 August: the announced complete shutdown of Paks was narrowly avoided. After output fell to 240 MW, a temporary rise in the Danube allowed the final generating turbine to remain online — it was still operating safely as of Tuesday 4 August, leaving the plant at just over 10% of its normal 2,000 MW capacity, with Reuters describing Hungary as having ‘narrowly avoided’ the complete shutdown. Nearly 90% of the plant’s capacity remains unavailable and the demand-reduction measures stand; the record should read: a full shutdown was announced — the first in 44 years — and narrowly avoided. · UPDATE 13 AUGUST — THE SECOND REACTOR GOES. The attempt to keep Cernavodă Unit 2 online has not held. Nuclearelectrica began a controlled disconnection of Unit 2 on Thursday 13 August, after the Danube at the plant fell below the level its cooling-water intake requires — reported at 182cm on 12 August against the 185cm needed. Unit 1 has been offline since late July for the same reason, so Romania’s only nuclear plant — normally about a fifth of national generation — is now entirely out. The engineering intervention recorded above bought time rather than a solution: the rock detonation lifted the level 2cm, and the river kept falling. Romania is bringing the 330 MW Rovinari 4 lignite unit out of reserve at Complexul Energetic Oltenia, with Hidroelectrica adding capacity within the limits of available water and regional imports covering the balance (Romania Insider; CEENERGYNEWS; Bloomberg). This is the threshold the drought has now crossed: low water has gone from constraining freight and lifting power prices to removing a country’s entire nuclear baseload. · UPDATE 15 AUGUST — HUNGARY GOES FURTHER THAN ROMANIA DID. Hungary is preparing to sink two 80-metre barges to raise the water around Paks, while constructing a longer-term riverbed sill. Paks is operating at roughly 25% of capacity. The barges may lift the level about 20cm; the sill may eventually lift it by as much as a metre. Set beside Romania shutting its last Danube-cooled reactor, the pattern is now explicit: low water is causing power-generation curtailment severe enough to justify extraordinary physical engineering of the riverbed itself. This remains a transmission channel — drought acting through rivers onto power and freight — rather than a separate cause in its own right (Reuters). · UPDATE 18 AUGUST — A LOWER KAUB READING, NOT YET A CONFIRMED RECORD. ELWIS recorded a provisional Kaub gauge reading of 9cm at 05:00 local time on 18 August, below the 21cm level reported on 4 August. If confirmed in the historical series, this constitutes a new record low. Observation time 05:00 local, 18 August 2026; source ELWIS, the German federal waterways information system; verified by OilWatch at 08:00 UTC on 18 August 2026. We do not restate “lowest since records began in 1880” as established fact until ELWIS or another authoritative source updates or confirms the historical series — the 4 August 21cm entry above stands as recorded. Gauge height is measured against a fixed reference point rather than the riverbed, so 9cm does not mean the navigable channel is nine centimetres deep. It does mean conditions at the Rhine’s principal shallow-water bottleneck are exceptional, and that vessels still able to pass are carrying sharply reduced loads.

The IEA estimates disrupted Hormuz transit has removed more than 300 million cubic metres a day of Qatar and UAE LNG since 1 March — over 2 bcm a week. Qatar's Ras Laffan complex has stayed offline since the 2 March attack, raising power and industrial costs and directly hitting ammonia and nitrogen-fertiliser production. A backlog is now building inside the Gulf: seven laden Qatari carriers were holding about 0.57 million tonnes, and S&P Global puts nearly 1.9 million tonnes of LNG tanker capacity inside the Gulf — roughly eight days of typical pre-war peak exports from the two projects. Production can continue while ships wait; once storage fills, producers may be forced to cut output. That is the next escalation to watch. Meanwhile exports have not stopped so much as gone dark. Bloomberg reports that visible LNG traffic through Hormuz has essentially halted since a Qatari carrier was attacked this month, yet Adnoc is still loading: an empty Adnoc-owned carrier crossed the strait on 29 July with its position broadcasters switched off, three more Adnoc-linked vessels went silent off the UAE coast on 24 July, and Copernicus Sentinel-2 imagery showed a tanker docked at the Das Island export terminal while no vessel was broadcasting nearby. Visible transit counts therefore understate real movement — a reason to treat every headline ship-count, including ours, as a floor rather than a measure. The cost of working around it is now visible in company accounts. QatarEnergy has bought 33 US spot LNG cargoes during 2026, worth roughly $1bn by Reuters estimates (28 delivered, five en route), to serve customers its own closer production cannot reliably reach — the largest LNG exporter buying LNG, the same inversion Russia shows in refined fuel. Italy's Edison, which normally takes about 6.4 bcm a year from QatarEnergy (around a tenth of Italian gas consumption), has had 24 cargoes cancelled or deferred between April and September and has replaced 17 of them, about 1.6 bcm. Europe is not going without; it is outbidding Asia for replacements, and every US cargo Qatar buys is one that cannot also land at Rotterdam or Wilhelmshaven.

The sulphur spike has moved from the trading screen into factory operations. Sulphur is needed to make sulphuric acid and phosphate fertilisers; high prices and tight availability have pushed phosphate producers to curtail output, notably Mosaic in Brazil. This is now a supply-volume risk, not just a price rise. Update 24 August 2026: the curtailment has widened well beyond Brazil. On its second-quarter call on 5 August Mosaic said it had “curtailed production in the U.S. and Brazil simply because phosphate industry economics cannot accommodate current sulfur prices”, with the Bartow plant “operating at 40% of its targeted annual rate to manage sulfur inventory levels”, Louisiana fertilizer production able to run fully down, and Brazil “not making or making very little commodity fertilizers”. Faustina’s ammonia plant is running full — a different product, and not a contradiction of the fertilizer curtailment. Third-quarter US sulphur supply was settled at $705 per long ton, described as considerably below the spot market, with realised third-quarter costs guided at roughly $700–710 per ton and phosphate sales volumes at 1.1–1.4 million tonnes. Mosaic also named a second supply disruption alongside the Gulf: “the ongoing Strait of Hormuz closure and the more recent Kazakhstan blockade continue to impact the global flow of sulfur”. Recorded with one caveat: Mosaic characterises Hormuz as a closure, whereas this board’s Hormuz row measures transit counts and records reduced rather than zero traffic; that distinction is preserved rather than overwritten by a customer’s shorthand. A separate claim circulating in secondary summaries — that Mosaic holds an 8 million tonne second-half run-rate target for US phosphate — does not appear in the transcript and is not recorded here.

China has tightened restrictions and customs controls on fertiliser exports to protect domestic availability. It also depends on Middle East sulphur imports, so Hormuz raises both Chinese production costs and how much Beijing is willing to release abroad. Update 24 August 2026 — correction. The original entry described Chinese fertiliser exports as uniformly restricted; that was incomplete, and the two main streams have been moving in opposite directions since before this row was last verified. Phosphate remains suspended: the NDRC suspension announced in December 2025 runs through August 2026 and was extended in mid-March 2026 to nitrogen-potassium blends and further phosphate grades, covering DAP, MAP and selected NPK, with Reuters analysis of customs data putting between 50% and 80% of China’s fertiliser export volumes under restriction. Urea, by contrast, was reopened: quotas were reissued on 26 May 2026, a first batch of about 3 million tonnes within a 2026 total of 3.3 million tonnes, on an implementation window running from June to August, with NDRC floor prices of $660 per tonne FOB for small-particle and $670 for large-particle urea, and the China Nitrogen Fertilizer Industry Association removing the export guidance price on 6 June 2026. Separately, China halted sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 after cutting the January–April quota to 700,000 tonnes against 1.3 million tonnes in the same period of 2025; its 2025 exports were 4.65 million tonnes. The urea reopening and the acid halt both predate this row’s previous verification date, so they are recorded as a correction of an incomplete claim rather than as fresh developments. Both the phosphate suspension and the urea quota window expire this month, and no successor policy had been announced as of 24 August 2026; that question is recorded as unresolved rather than guessed at.

Brazil imports about 85% of all the fertiliser it consumes and covered effectively 100% of its urea needs by imports in 2025 — around 41% of those urea imports (nearly 3 million tonnes) routed through Hormuz. It also faces high sulphur costs and phosphate curtailments; its September soybean planting is the key test of whether input disruption becomes reduced production. Update 24 August 2026: the domestic cushion has thinned. Mosaic told its 5 August second-quarter call it is “not making or making very little commodity fertilizers” in Brazil “given the sulfur availability and affordability issue”, so reduced domestic phosphate output now sits on top of the import dependence described above. The USDA’s 12 August WASDE left Brazilian corn production unchanged at 139.00 million tonnes but raised domestic use from 98.00 to 100.00 million tonnes and cut ending stocks from 11.10 to 10.10 million tonnes. Input costs are not moving as one: international urea was around $390 per tonne in the week to 17 August, down 7.7% on the month and 11.5% on the year, while DAP rose 3.6% on the month and sulphur stood 261.6% above a year earlier. The row’s own test — whether input disruption becomes reduced production — has not yet run, since soybean planting begins in mid-September; it is not treated here as answered.

Higher fertiliser, diesel and agrochemical costs meet rising dependence on imported corn. Lower Mexican output could hit the US from two sides — less Mexican fruit and veg moving north, more US corn moving south — pressuring US produce prices and animal-feed costs at once. Update 24 August 2026 — reviewed, no state change identified. The USDA’s 12 August WASDE left every line of the Mexican corn balance unchanged from July: beginning stocks 5.90, production 24.60, imports 27.70, feed use 31.20, total use 53.40, exports 0.02 and ending stocks 4.78 million tonnes. On the price side the picture is split rather than uniformly rising: US CPI for July, released 12 August, put fruits and vegetables 5.1% higher over twelve months but 0.1% lower on the month, with lettuce down 16.4%, and food at home 2.7% higher over the year. The causal chain this row watches — fertiliser, diesel and agrochemical costs feeding through to US produce prices — remains a hypothesis and not a finding: published analysis of US produce inflation attributes it to a mix that includes tariffs, labour supply, wages, weather and transport alongside input costs, and no attribution to fertiliser cost alone is recorded here.

USDA projects both wheat and corn below consumption in 2026/27, with global corn ending stocks about 275 Mt — the lowest since 2013/14. Not yet a shortage, but less room to absorb another crop, trade or shipping shock. Update 24 August 2026: the core claim holds but the direction now splits by crop. In WASDE-674, approved 12 August 2026, world corn production for 2026/27 is 1,298.88 million tonnes against domestic use of 1,323.05 million, and world wheat production is 819.30 million against use of 826.27 million — so both crops remain below consumption. Their stocks, however, moved in opposite directions: global corn ending stocks fell 0.60 to 274.66 million tonnes, the report noting “Global corn stocks, at 274.7 million tons, are down 0.6 million”, while world wheat ending stocks were raised 0.41 to 273.25 million tonnes. World wheat trade was cut 0.3 to 212.71 million tonnes, with USDA recording that “Russia and Ukraine exports are lowered on logistical disruptions arising from the increased conflict between the two countries in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea”, and US corn exports were raised 75 million bushels to 3.3 billion partly on constrained Ukrainian supply. A single “margin shrinking” direction no longer covers both crops and is not used here. The “lowest since 2013/14” comparison is carried forward from the previous verification and was not re-checked against the historical series in this pass.

The first rupture marker has fired. Thirty-year US Treasury yields are back above 5% (10-year near 4.55%) as the oil shock revives inflation fears, and futures have swung toward pricing a September Fed hike as near-certain, from roughly two-thirds probability a week earlier. Bonds and equities are therefore falling together — the loss of the traditional safe haven that our pressure-cooker analysis names as the first of three markers of systemic rupture — though so far this reflects inflation repricing the rate path rather than a liquidation overwhelming the safe-haven bid. Equity stress is broadening: South Korea's chip-heavy market fell 4.1% after nearly 9% the week before, and the Philadelphia semiconductor index sits ~20% below its June record. The second marker has not fired: the yen is still near a 40-year low around 162 to the dollar, so the yen-funded carry trade has not entered forced repayment. Energy is now actively driving rate expectations while leveraged positions weaken — dangerous, but not yet global liquidation. Update 24 August 2026: the first marker has intensified and the second has not fired, but its mechanism has changed. On the rate channel, the 30-year US Treasury yield reached a 19-year high on 18 August, quoted at 5.285% and above 5.33%, with fiscal concern now joining inflation as a driver after the July federal deficit came in at its highest monthly total since March 2021. The Federal Reserve held on 29 July at 3.50–3.75% on a 9–3 vote, the dissents of Hammack, Kashkari and Logan all favouring a hike; the next meeting falls on 16 September, and markets price two quarter-point increases, in September and December. On the funding channel, the yen has strengthened rather than weakened: a joint Japan–US intervention in late July moved it to ¥155 from roughly ¥164, and it stood at about ¥159.1 on 24 August, some 2.9% stronger over the month — so the figure of “around 162” recorded above is superseded. Estimates put the Japanese operation near $75bn and the much smaller US leg at $5–10bn, but these are explicitly described by their author as guesswork and are recorded as estimates only; the US leg bought yen with euros rather than dollars, and Japan’s finance ministry defended ¥160 as its line. A September Bank of Japan increase to 1.25% from 1.0% is around 82% priced, up from roughly 23% before the July meeting. Critically, the carry trade has still not entered forced repayment, and the intervention appears to have made it cheaper to extend: Japanese investors net bought more than ¥5 trillion of foreign equities and long-term bonds in the two weeks to 15 August. On equities, the Korean market’s drawdown remains the stable measure — a record close of 9,385.59 on 19 June against roughly 6,850 to 6,913 on 20–21 August, about 27% below the peak — while daily moves are violently two-way and same-day secondary reports contradict one another, so no daily figure is recorded.

Heat and drought have pushed French maize conditions to their lowest in at least 15 years; Coceral has cut its EU maize forecast about 8% to 52.7 Mt, potentially the smallest harvest since 2007. High fertiliser and energy costs had already trimmed planted area. Update 24 August 2026: three independent bodies now place the EU crop below the Coceral figure recorded above. The European Commission cut its 2026/27 EU maize forecast to 51.9 million tonnes in late July, the lowest since 2007, and the USDA’s WASDE-674 of 12 August cut EU corn production from 53.78 to 50.20 million tonnes in a single month while raising EU corn imports from 22.50 to 23.50 million tonnes; the report attributes this to “major EU corn production areas reduce yield prospects and area is also lowered”, and notes more wheat going to feed “as EU corn supplies are curtailed further”. On crop condition, FranceAgriMer rated 31% of grain maize good or excellent by 3 August, down from 34% the previous week and 67% a year earlier, the lowest in records dating to 2011; that reading is consistent with the 38% recorded by 20 July, itself down from 40% a week earlier and 69% a year before. Weekly condition readings after 3 August could not be established: available secondary reports returned mutually inconsistent figures that do not fit the 2026 series and appear to mix crop years, so no post-3-August percentage is recorded here.