← Back to dashboard

Global Oil Supply Routes

Status of the key maritime chokepoints and supply routes that affect UK and European fuel security. The transit, port-flow and sea-state panels below refresh daily from satellite-AIS and weather feeds; the chokepoint risk assessments further down are maintained editorially.

→ Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline — a sourced, filterable chronology of the 2026 crisis.

Live Global AIS — Shipping & Tanker Traffic

Map: VesselFinder →

Illustrative, not a count. Live positions of vessels broadcasting AIS worldwide — pan and zoom to any region or chokepoint. Ships running dark (AIS off) or affected by GPS spoofing do not appear, so this is a live picture, not a measure of traffic. For chokepoint transit counts — the authoritative figures — see the Hormuz throughput and IMF PortWatch panels below. Map data © VesselFinder.

Global Supply Chokepoints — Risk Overview

World map showing maritime supply chokepoints affecting UK and European fuel security
Risk:NormalElevatedHighCritical

14 July 2026 — Both powers claim Hormuz: Iran declares it closed; the US drops its 20% toll but tightens a full Iran blockade

The US–Iran conflict has escalated sharply since the July ceasefire collapsed. Over the weekend Iran’s IRGC declared the Strait of Hormuz closed “until further notice” — after its forces struck the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy (engine-room fire, crew evacuated to a lifeboat, one crew member missing; CENTCOM). The US answered with further rounds of strikes, the latest on Sunday using one-way attack sea drones for the first time, and Iran retaliated across Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman — including the first strike on Gulf oil infrastructure in weeks, a Kuwaiti drilling facility. Oil jumped at Monday’s open, Brent trading above $79 and WTI near $74; by Tuesday Brent had pushed above $85, a four-week high, as the war premium returned in force.

On Monday the US hardened its claim over the strait: in a Truth Social post President Trump declared Hormuz “OPEN… with or without Iran,” reinstated a US blockade of Iranian ships and customers, styled the United States the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” and proposed a 20% fee on all cargo transiting the waterway, the process to “begin immediately.” Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority countered that passage was “currently unfeasible” and suspended transit permits. Both powers now assert a right to control — and charge for — the chokepoint, days after the IMO Council ruled that transit through international straits may not be tolled. On Tuesday, after backlash from shippers and the IMO ruling, Trump abandoned the 20% fee — replacing it with a push for Gulf trade and investment deals — while keeping a full blockade on Iran-linked shipping (vessels to or from Iranian ports, or carrying Iranian cargo), which CENTCOM began enforcing that afternoon.

Iranian officials say a US projectile hit the perimeter area of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and Reuters has carried the perimeter claim — but there is no independent confirmation that the reactor itself was hit. Earlier IAEA and Reuters reporting on previous Bushehr incidents found no reactor damage or radiological release; no fresh IAEA confirmation has yet been seen for this latest strike.

Reuters ship-tracking found at least four oil and gas tankers reversed course near the strait; others continued to transit. The strait’s status is now openly contested — Iran declares it closed while the US and CENTCOM insist it stays open to lawful transit, and the JMIC says the Oman-coordinated southern lane remains available. The US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center has raised the transit threat to “severe” — up from “substantial,” its highest since mid-June — and the IMO Secretary-General has urged shipowners not to expose crews to unnecessary danger by transiting while safety cannot be assured. Brent spiked about 6% to near $80 as the fighting resumed, round-tripped to about $76 by Friday, then jumped back above $79 at Monday’s open and above $85 by Tuesday.

A fresh JMIC advisory (013-26, 10 July) keeps the threat level at “severe” but stresses the strait stays open: the southern transit route has been expanded and remains available to all traffic, coordination with NAVCENT’s NCAGS is offered but not mandatory, and — pointedly — “there is no controlling authority regulating passage or fee required for any route.” US NAVCENT added that “no nation has the authority to close or control the Strait of Hormuz,” with US forces prepared to defend freedom of navigation. Mariners are warned of a mine-danger area in the traditional traffic-separation scheme and to expect VHF hailing from naval forces.

War-risk insurance underlines the caution. Marsh, the world’s largest marine broker, says premiums to transit Hormuz now run 2–6% of a vessel’s value — up from a fraction of a percent before the war, having peaked near 10% at the height of the fighting (large no-claim discounts often trim the headline rate). Brokers report fewer requests for quotes since the ceasefire frayed this week, though cover remains available (Bloomberg, 9 Jul). The Lloyd’s Joint War Committee has listed the whole Gulf as high-risk since March — a listing that adds cost and a notification duty but does not bar transit.

On a second front, Ukraine’s drone campaign in the Sea of Azov has escalated sharply. Its Unmanned Systems Forces say they have struck Russian shadow-fleet shipping — the tankers that move sanctioned oil and products — across a nine-day operation, with Kyiv now putting the total at 116 vessels(an unverified claim; ~76, including 21 tankers, was the earlier multi-sourced count). In response Russia suspended shipping through the Kerch Strait and the Don–Azov Canal (FSB Border Service, from 10 July) and says it may divert to Black Sea and Baltic ports — a self-imposed chokepoint closure that cut Azov AIS traffic roughly55% (Starboard Maritime). With up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports transiting the Azov, Euronext wheat jumped about 4% to a six-week high. The IMO Secretary-General condemned the Azov and Black Sea attacks, warning the focus on Hormuz should not overshadow threats elsewhere; Russia’s Lavrov called them “terrorism,” while Kyiv says it strikes only military or war-supporting assets. Neither side’s figures are independently verified (Reuters, TWZ, gCaptain).

Sources: Reuters, WSJ, Bloomberg, JMIC 013-26, NAVCENT/NCAGS, Lloyd’s JWC, IMO, CENTCOM, UKMTO. Available footage and Tier-1 reporting attribute the “cancer” remark to Iran’s government and leadership — not the Iranian people, and not a call for their eradication.

Strait of Hormuz — Tanker Throughput

vs 2023 baseline

20%of normal

▲ rebounded from ~0% trough (2026-06-17)

2026-04-142026-07-12

Transits

6/day

11% of 2023

Cargo

~4.1 mb/d

derived ×7.33

vs normal

20%

by tonnage

Tanker throughput through Hormuz collapsed to near-zero at the height of the conflict and had rebounded to about 20% of its 2023 norm through 2026-07-12 — a real recovery, but still far below normal. The 7-day transit rate (~6/day) matches independent shipbroker counts.

Read it as a floor. This is an AIS-based count, and a meaningful share of post-conflict Hormuz traffic runs with transponders off (dark transit) or via evasive routing — so true movement is likely higher than the figure shown.

Aggregate strait transits (all tankers, all origins) — not by-country loadings or empty-tanker inflows, which require paid vessel intelligence. mb/d derived from cargo tonnage at 7.33 bbl/tonne.

Source: IMF PortWatch · satellite-AIS chokepoint transits · latest 2026-07-12

Strait of Hormuz — Force Posture

Operation Epic Fury · reported, not live positions

US / Coalition

  • Carrier strike groupsconfirmed

    The U.S. briefly surged three aircraft carriers into the Middle East in April — Ford, Lincoln and George H.W. Bush — per CENTCOM-cited reporting at the time (the first three-carrier presence there since 2003). By July, open-source fleet trackers and Navy releases point to a two-carrier posture in the Arabian Sea, centred on USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, with amphibious big-deck ships (Tripoli, Boxer) also in the region. USS Gerald R. Ford returned to Norfolk on 16 May after an 11-month deployment and is not part of the July posture.

    USNI Fleet & Marine Tracker (7 Jul) · Navy releases (11 Jul) · Breaking Defense (Apr) · AP (Ford return) · confirmed 11 Jul

  • Freedom-of-navigation postureconfirmed

    CENTCOM states the strait is open to lawful transit and its forces are positioned to ensure it (“Iran does not control the strait. Traffic is flowing.”), with near-daily strikes on Iranian coastal military targets in response to attacks on shipping.

    CENTCOM / Washington Times · confirmed 12 Jul

  • Mine countermeasuresconfirmed

    US naval mine-clearance missions reported in the strait; President Trump has instructed the Navy to fire on Iranian vessels caught laying mines.

    CENTCOM reporting · confirmed 12 Jul

Iran (IRGC Navy / IRIN)

  • Fast-attack craft (swarm)assessed

    Large inventory of small fast-attack craft (Zolfaghar- and Peykaap-class) built for asymmetric hit-and-run swarm tactics — speed, dispersion and saturation to surround a vessel; armed with heavy machine guns, rockets and short-range anti-ship missiles.

    IISS / CNN ‘mosquito fleet’ · confirmed 8 May

  • Coastal anti-ship missilesassessed

    Coastal ASCM batteries and craft-mounted missiles — e.g. the short-range Nasr-1 and the Zafar (≈250 km, subsonic, INS/GPS) — designed to salvo against merchant and naval vessels transiting the strait.

    Strauss Center / US ONI · confirmed 15 May

  • Naval minesassessed

    Substantial sea-mine inventory — the classic Hormuz-closure tool and the trigger for the US mine-clearance operations now under way.

    Strauss Center · confirmed 12 Jul

  • Submarines & recent activityassessed

    IRGC Navy has put submarines and fast boats into the strait (Maritime Security Belt 2026 exercise) and has attacked commercial vessels with fast-attack craft in recent weeks.

    Army Recognition / reporting · confirmed 11 Jul

  • Key basesassessed

    Bandar Abbas (principal IRGCN/IRIN base) and Jask, plus dispersed coastal sites along the northern shore of the strait.

    Strauss Center · confirmed 1 Jun

Recent incidents · from the crisis timeline

Full chronology: Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline →

Reported open-source posture — approximate, drawn from public agency statements, wire reporting and reference works, NOT live tactical positions. Exact locations and counts are not publicly confirmed and change constantly. 'Confirmed' = stated in official/agency reporting; 'Assessed' = analyst or reference estimate (e.g. IISS, ONI, CSIS).

Chokepoint Transit Monitor

Tanker tonnage (DWT) vs 2023 baseline · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)
Oil Route StressSevere

Strait of Hormuz tanker tonnage is at 20% of normal, with Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait also restricted; traffic is rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope (160% of baseline).

Crude- and product-carrying capacity actually moving through each chokepoint — weighted by tanker size (a VLCC isn’t a coastal product tanker).

Strait of HormuzAIS low
6.3/day tankers · 16.4/day all vessels
20%
severely restricted
Suez Canal
15/day tankers · 41.1/day all vessels
56%
depressed
Bab el-Mandeb StraitAIS low
12.1/day tankers · 32.3/day all vessels
61%
near normal
Bosporus Strait
21.4/day tankers · 81.9/day all vessels
110%
near normal
Panama Canal
14.4/day tankers · 30.4/day all vessels
124%
elevated (diversion)
Cape of Good Hope
17.7/day tankers · 90.4/day all vessels
160%
elevated (diversion)

Latest data 2026-07-12 (≈7 days ago) — PortWatch reports in arrears, so it confirms shifts after the fact, not in real time. The % is tanker capacity (DWT) vs the 2023 daily average (trailing 7-day); ship counts shown for context. Lanes marked AIS low are conflict zones where spoofing, jamming or vessels going dark mean these figures are a floor — a significant share of Hormuz traffic runs with transponders off, so true movement is likely higher. Source: IMF PortWatch — estimated from satellite AIS, not customs data. PortWatch does not tell us the exact barrel, grade or buyer — only whether the ships needed to move the oil economy are actually moving.

Port Oil-Flow Monitor

Tanker import/export vs 2023 baseline · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)

Crude and product moving through major hubs — daily tanker tonnage in (↓) and out (↑), with how it compares to the 2023 average. Where the barrels are actually going.

UK & NW Europe

🇳🇱
Rotterdam
391 in · ↑ 108 out kt/d · net import
90%
near 2023
🇧🇪
Antwerp
93 in · ↑ 93 out kt/d · balanced
85%
below 2023
🇬🇧
Milford Haven
28 in · ↑ 22 out kt/d · net import
67%
below 2023
🇬🇧
Fawley
24 in · ↑ 18 out kt/d · net import
82%
below 2023
🇬🇧
Immingham
5 in · ↑ 15 out kt/d · net export
48%
well below 2023
🇬🇧
Grangemouth
10 in · ↑ 0 out kt/d · net import
94%
near 2023

Global oil hubs

🇺🇸
Houston
37 in · ↑ 354 out kt/d · net export
90%
near 2023
🇷🇺
Novorossiysk
0 in · ↑ 300 out kt/d · net export
235%
above 2023
🇦🇪
Fujairah
32 in · ↑ 53 out kt/d · net export
40%
well below 2023

Latest data 2026-07-10 (PortWatch reports ~a week in arrears — it confirms shifts after the fact, not in real time). Volumes in thousand tonnes/day (kt/d), trailing 7-day average vs 2023. Source: IMF PortWatch — tanker tonnage estimated from satellite AIS, not customs data; some terminals (e.g. Gulf export ports) are under-covered and read low.

Live Sea State — Oil Shipping Chokepoints

Significant wave height, wave period, and 10-metre wind speed. Updated 18 Jul, 18:35 UTC.

CalmModerateRoughDangerous

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Calm

0.30m

wave height

4.3s

period

4kt · g6ENE

wind

Bab el-Mandeb

Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

Moderate

0.96m

wave height

3.6s

period

20kt · g30NW

wind

Suez Approaches (Port Said)

Eastern Mediterranean

Calm

0.32m

wave height

3.5s

period

5kt · g9N

wind

English Channel (Dover Strait)

NW Europe

Moderate

0.74m

wave height

3.5s

period

11kt · g15NE

wind

Skagerrak

North Sea / Baltic

Rough

2.24m

wave height

6.1s

period

25kt · g35NNE

wind

Source: Open-Meteo Marine + Forecast APIs (sourced from European met agencies). Risk band uses Douglas-style sea-state (wave height) and Beaufort-style wind thresholds; whichever is worse sets the band. open-meteo.com ↗

War-Risk Watch

Editorial · updated weekly

JWC Listed Areas — high risk

Strait of HormuzPersian / Arabian GulfGulf of OmanGulf of AdenIndian Ocean (Somali HRA)Southern Red Sea / Bab-el-MandebBlack SeaSea of AzovGulf of GuineaLibyan watersYemeni waters

Latest list change (2026-03-03): JWC circular JWLA-033 (3 March 2026) added Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar to listed areas and amended the broader Persian/Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Southern Red Sea zone. No areas have been removed since.

Premium readings (publicly cited)

  • Persian / Mideast Gulf transitw/w broadly stable
    around 1% of hull value per voyage
    S&P Global Commodity Insights; Marsh McLennan; Reuters (Mar–Jun 2026)
  • Strait of Hormuz — voyage-specificw/w voyage-dependent
    higher and volatile; quoted as high as ~3% during peak March tension, ~0.8% on successful transits after no-claims adjustments
    Reuters (March 2026); S&P Global
  • Sea of Azov / Kerch Straitw/w sharply higher
    route effectively shut — Russia suspended Kerch Strait & Don–Azov Canal transit (from 10 Jul) after a nine-day Ukrainian drone campaign against the shadow fleet; Kyiv claims 116 vessels hit (~76 multi-sourced, incl. 21 tankers), Azov AIS traffic down ~55%
    Reuters, TWZ, gCaptain, Starboard Maritime (Jul 2026)

Current reading: Cover is still being written in the London market — the Lloyd's Market Association reports war-risk insurance remains available — but terms have hardened and pricing now turns voyage by voyage as the US–Iran war intensifies around Hormuz. Both Washington and Tehran now claim to control the strait: Iran demands permits and has called passage 'currently unfeasible,' while President Trump has floated a 20% US toll on all Hormuz cargo (the IMO Council has ruled transit through international straits may not be tolled, and no US collection mechanism exists yet). Brent has jumped above $85, transits have thinned to a five-week low, and AIS-dark crossings are rising. A second, self-inflicted chokepoint has opened in the north: after Ukrainian drones struck ~76 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov (including 21 tankers of the sanctioned shadow fleet), Russia suspended the Kerch Strait and Don–Azov Canal — hull risk on Black Sea/Azov shadow-fleet tankers is now acute. Two of the world's contested waterways are impaired at once, for unrelated reasons.

Watch next: The signals that matter now: whether Trump's 20% Hormuz toll moves from declaration toward any executive order or collection mechanism; confirmation or denial of Iranian permit/fee enforcement; whether Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia (Abha, the first since the 2022 truce) shift from airports to oil facilities — the spare-capacity buffer holding the price; the pace of Ukrainian Azov strikes and any Russian reopening of the Kerch Strait; and further insurer/JWC action (a possible JWLA-034 circular) confirming a fresh hardening.

Premium ranges aggregated from publicly-cited figures in news sources; exact rates are confidential between brokers and underwriters. JWC Listed Areas from Lloyd's Joint War Committee circular JWLA-033 (3 March 2026). Editorial reading is our market interpretation, not a republished source. Updated 14 Jul 2026.

Current Route Status — 18 July 2026

Status reflects current editorial assessment based on publicly available information. Risk levels: Normal · Elevated · High · Critical

Live Risk Signals — Past 24h

Source: GDACS →

GDACS (Global Disaster Alerting Coordination System) — UN/EC automated alerts. Red/Orange shown globally. Green shown only for oil-supply-relevant countries.

🌍

Seismic Signals — M5.0+ Past 7 Days

Source: USGS →

M5.0+ earthquakes near oil infrastructure regions: Middle East & Gulf, North Africa, Caspian, Caucasus, North Sea, Southern Europe. Shallow quakes (<70km) near refineries carry highest operational risk.

🔥

Thermal Anomalies — Major Refineries & Terminals

No thermal anomalies detected near tracked 24 major EU and Gulf refineries / terminals in the past 24 hours.

NASA FIRMS VIIRS satellite detections within ~15 km of 24 major EU and Gulf refineries / terminals. Past 24 h. High Fire Radiative Power near a facility may indicate flaring, fire, or process incident — not all detections indicate incidents.

Bunker Fuel Prices

Ship & Bunker →
RotterdamARA
NW Europe
VLSFO
$583/mt 0.3
MGO
$703/mt 0.3
FujairahFUJA
Middle East
VLSFO
$598/mt 0.3
MGO
$718/mt 0.3
SingaporeSING
Asia-Pacific
VLSFO
$591/mt 0.3
MGO
$713/mt 0.3

Derived from Brent, not live market quotes. Formula: VLSFO ≈ Brent × 6.5 + 10, MGO ≈ Brent × 6.5 + 130 (basis $88.1/bbl). During supply disruptions, real physical bunker prices for prompt delivery typically run substantially higher than this — see Ship & Bunker or Bunker Index for actual market quotes. VLSFO = IMO 2020 compliant very low sulphur fuel oil. MGO = marine gas oil (ECA-grade).

Bunker Prices — Historical Trend

Estimated from Brent crude benchmark. VLSFO = IMO 2020 low-sulphur fuel oil. MGO = marine gas oil.

Active Disruption Risk

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Critical — tanker tonnage at 20% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Indirect / price impact

Daily flow

~20 mb/d

Location

Between Iran and Oman, connecting Persian Gulf to Arabian Sea

The Strait of Hormuz remains the master variable for global oil. After the conflict that began in late February 2026 effectively closed it, the EIA assumed Hormuz stayed shut into late May, with traffic only beginning to pick up in June. Iran now says the strait will reopen only under new conditions — including possible transit fees set with Oman — which Washington opposes and Oman has reportedly declined to support. Iran describes the strait as open, but in practice only a handful of crude, product and LNG vessels have exited recently — often with AIS gaps or under heightened risk — while overall Gulf flows stay far below normal. Open on paper, restricted in practice.

UK Impact

Approximately 20% of global seaborne oil and LNG normally transits Hormuz. The IEA put Gulf output affected by the closure around 14.4 mb/d below pre-war levels, with total supply losses since February of roughly 12.8 mb/d — which it has called the largest disruption on record. Even as paper prices ease on diplomacy headlines, physical crude stays tight, keeping Atlantic Basin premiums elevated and UK import costs for diesel, jet fuel and heating oil under pressure. Scotland, with no domestic refining capacity since Grangemouth's closure, remains maximally exposed.

Hormuz is Washington's top priority and Tehran's main leverage in unresolved US–Iran talks, alongside sanctions, frozen funds and nuclear limits. The early-June Israeli strike on Iran's Mahshahr petrochemical complex — the first hit on Iranian energy infrastructure since the April ceasefire — put a direct energy-asset risk premium back on top of the chokepoint risk. Even after a reopening, recovery is slow: Kuwait says it could restore about 70% of output within 6–8 weeks, with the remainder taking roughly another month. The Red Sea/Suez route remains independently disrupted by Houthi attacks.

Suez Canal

Egypt — Red Sea to Mediterranean

High — tanker tonnage down to 56% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Moderate UK impact

Daily flow

~5.5 mb/d

Location

Northeast Egypt, connecting Red Sea (via Gulf of Suez) to Mediterranean

The Suez Canal carries around 5.5 mb/d of oil and petroleum products plus significant LNG volumes. Houthi attacks have kept the Red Sea route effectively closed to most commercial tankers since late 2023, and Cape of Good Hope diversion is now the near-permanent operating norm for Gulf-to-Europe cargoes. Canal transit volumes remain far below pre-disruption levels.

UK Impact

Cape routing adds 10–14 days and substantial freight cost to UK-bound cargoes from the Middle East and Asia. This remains embedded in import costs. With Hormuz still constrained, both primary Gulf export corridors remain under simultaneous pressure — the compound squeeze on UK diesel, jet fuel and heating oil availability persists.

The Sumed pipeline can carry approximately 2.5 mb/d of crude as a bypass but not refined products. UK and European refiners have largely adapted sourcing to Atlantic Basin and North Sea suppliers, but at higher cost. A resolution to Houthi attacks remains the necessary condition for Suez Canal volumes to recover.

Bab-el-Mandeb Strait

Yemen / Djibouti — Red Sea entrance

Critical — MARAD 2026-006: Houthi Attacks on Commercial VesselsModerate UK impact

Daily flow

~4.5 mb/d

Location

Between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea, connecting Gulf of Aden to Red Sea

The southern entrance to the Red Sea remains actively disrupted by Houthi attacks since November 2023. Around 4.5 mb/d of oil and products normally transits this route. The shipping industry continues to largely avoid Bab-el-Mandeb, with daily traffic far below pre-attack levels. With Hormuz also still constrained, both primary Gulf-to-UK export corridors remain under simultaneous pressure.

UK Impact

UK-relevant shipping continues to route via the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10,000+ nautical miles and 10–14 days to Middle Eastern cargo journeys. With Hormuz constrained at the same time, both disruptions overlapping represent the most severe supply-corridor constraint since the 1973 oil embargo. Scotland remains entirely reliant on import routes with no domestic refining capacity since Grangemouth's closure.

Operation Prosperity Guardian has not restored normal transit confidence. Insurance premiums for Red Sea passage remain prohibitively elevated. The Houthi threat is geopolitically linked to the broader US-Iran-Israel conflict; renewed Houthi threats in the Red Sea are an active watch-item alongside the constrained Hormuz corridor. Red Sea normalisation requires a separate Houthi ceasefire.

Reviewed 18 Jul 2026

South China Sea — Scarborough Shoal

West Philippines Sea / South China Sea

High — blockage disrupting Asian supply flowsIndirect / price impact

Daily flow

~3.4 mb/d

Location

Scarborough Shoal, approximately 220km west of the Philippines, within the broader South China Sea corridor

Chinese naval and coast guard vessels have established a blockade around Scarborough Shoal, disrupting Philippine maritime access and raising the risk of broader interference with commercial tanker traffic. The sea lane carries approximately 3.4 mb/d of oil — primarily Middle Eastern crude transiting to China, Japan, and South Korea — along with significant LNG volumes.

UK Impact

The South China Sea does not sit on the primary UK supply route, but its disruption feeds into UK fuel markets through displaced demand. If Chinese and East Asian buyers cannot secure normal Gulf supply volumes, they compete more aggressively for Atlantic Basin, West African, and North Sea cargoes — the same pool UK refiners and importers draw on. With Hormuz still constrained, Gulf supply to Asia is already severely limited — a South China Sea escalation would further intensify competition for alternative supply and amplify UK import cost pressure.

The Scarborough Shoal blockade escalates well beyond previous China-Philippines stand-offs and has drawn US statements under the Mutual Defense Treaty. A full closure of the broader South China Sea to commercial traffic would represent one of the most severe supply shocks in modern history. The situation is being monitored by the IEA and has been noted in IMF growth revisions.

Normal Conditions

Danish Straits

Denmark / Sweden — Baltic Sea access

Normal — monitoring Baltic activityModerate UK impact

Daily flow

~3 mb/d

Location

Between Denmark and Sweden, connecting Baltic Sea to North Sea

The Danish Straits (Øresund, Great Belt, Little Belt) are the only maritime access to the Baltic Sea. Around 3 mb/d of Russian oil exports — primarily crude and oil products from Baltic ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Kaliningrad) — transited this route before Western sanctions. Post-sanctions, the mix has shifted but Baltic tanker traffic remains significant.

UK Impact

Reduced but not eliminated. Russian oil products previously accounted for a significant share of UK diesel imports. Post-2022 sanctions have redirected UK supply to Middle Eastern and US sources. The Danish Straits remain relevant as a conduit for Norwegian and other Baltic energy flows.

NATO membership of Denmark and Sweden, and the proximity of Baltic submarine cable incidents, has raised strategic sensitivity around this chokepoint. Shadow fleet tankers carrying Russian oil still transit regularly, raising insurance and environmental concerns.

Reviewed 8 Apr 2026

Turkish Straits

Turkey — Black Sea to Mediterranean

Normal — tanker tonnage near the 2023 norm (110%) (live · IMF PortWatch)Indirect / price impact

Daily flow

~2.4 mb/d

Location

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, connecting Black Sea to Aegean Sea

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits control access between the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Around 2.4 mb/d passes through, primarily Kazakhstani crude via the CPC pipeline and Russian Black Sea exports. Turkey has periodically restricted tanker passage, citing insurance and safety requirements linked to Western price cap sanctions on Russian oil.

UK Impact

Indirect. Price cap compliance disputes have caused periodic delays to Kazakh crude exports, tightening Mediterranean crude markets and creating knock-on price effects. UK supply is not directly routed via the Turkish Straits, but European refinery economics are affected.

Turkey controls passage under the 1936 Montreux Convention. Russia has contested Western price cap enforcement in these waters. Insurance requirements for tankers carrying sanctioned oil have been a recurring flashpoint.

Reviewed 12 Jul 2026

North Sea / UKCS

UK Continental Shelf

Normal — managed declineDirect UK impact

Daily flow

~1.4 mb/d

Location

UK Continental Shelf, Norwegian Sea, north to Shetland Basin

North Sea production from the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) peaked in 1999 at around 2.9 mb/d and has been declining since. Current output is approximately 1.4 mb/d of oil equivalent. Fields include Forties, Buzzard, and newer West of Shetland developments. Petroineos ceased refinery operations at Grangemouth in April 2025; the site now operates as an import and fuels distribution terminal.

UK Impact

Direct. North Sea crude is the UK's primary domestic oil source, reducing import dependence. Scotland now has no operating refinery — all refined fuels arrive via import, increasing exposure to global supply disruptions. With Hormuz still constrained (open on paper but restricted in practice as of June 2026) and Red Sea disruption ongoing, and no domestic Scottish refining capacity, Scotland remains exposed to any renewed Gulf supply shock.

The North Sea Transition Deal sets out a managed transition framework. New field approvals (Rosebank, Jackdaw) remain politically contested. Norwegian flows via the Langeled pipeline provide additional security for UK gas supplies, which affects heating oil demand dynamics.

🗺️

Live Tanker Map — UK & North Sea

LIVE

Real-time AIS positions of oil tankers in UK waters, the North Sea, and the English Channel

About this page

This page provides an editorial assessment of key oil supply routes and their current status. Flow volumes are approximate figures from IEA and EIA public data. Risk assessments reflect publicly available information and are updated periodically — this is not a live or automated feed.

For authoritative supply data, see EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints and the IEA.

For EU-wide reserve data, see EuroOilWatch →