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Global Oil Supply Routes

Status of the key maritime chokepoints and supply routes that affect UK and European fuel security. The transit, port-flow and sea-state panels below refresh daily from satellite-AIS and weather feeds; the chokepoint risk assessments further down are maintained editorially.

→ Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline — a sourced, filterable chronology of the 2026 crisis.

Live Global AIS — Shipping & Tanker Traffic

Map: VesselFinder →

Illustrative, not a count. Live positions of vessels broadcasting AIS worldwide — pan and zoom to any region or chokepoint. Ships running dark (AIS off) or affected by GPS spoofing do not appear, so this is a live picture, not a measure of traffic. For chokepoint transit counts — the authoritative figures — see the Hormuz throughput and IMF PortWatch panels below. Map data © VesselFinder.

Global Supply Chokepoints — Risk Overview

World map showing maritime supply chokepoints affecting UK and European fuel security
Risk:NormalElevatedHighCritical

31 August 2026 — A corridor, a mine-free declaration — and the ships still did not return

What was rechecked. Three things happened after the note below. On 25 August Iran and Oman issued a joint statement setting out a temporary joint maritime corridor and a joint mine-clearance project, with Tehran conditioning implementation on US steps it has not published. On 27 August CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper declared the internationally recognised lanes free of Iranian sea mines. On 30 August US forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island, saying Revolutionary Guard units were preparing to fire rockets carrying sea mines into the strait — an account not independently established — and Iran fired missiles at US positions in Jordan, which reported intercepting eight without damage. It was the first direct exchange in about a month.

The measurement that matters is the one that did not move. With a corridor agreed and the lanes declared clear, Kpler still counted 10 visible commodity vessels on Wednesday 26 August and 8 on Tuesday, against a ten-day moving average near 15 and pre-war traffic above 130 a day; tracking estimates put movement at roughly 5–15% of normal. Visible counts exclude AIS-dark transits and are a floor, not a census — but the floor did not rise when the stated obstacles were removed. A corridor that exists diplomatically is not a corridor that operates commercially.

Status, stated plainly. Hormuz: NOT reopened; corridor agreed but unimplemented, lanes declared clear, traffic still a fraction of normal. Larak is an escalation in disruption risk, not a verified new supply loss — no further export interruption has been confirmed. Brent returned above $90 ($90.32 at 22:02 GMT on 30 August). Next review triggers: a verified fall below the late-August transit level, a confirmed mining attempt, published routing and insurer acceptance for the corridor, or cargo-verified movement resuming.

21 August 2026 — Three assessments rechecked; a corridor claim is not a verified flow

What was rechecked today. The North Sea/UKCS, Danish Straits and Scarborough Shoal assessments below were re-reviewed against current reporting. North Sea/UKCS: current, clarified — the NSTA’s 13 August decommissioning update adds cost-side detail without changing the structural-decline assessment. Danish Straits: elevated stands — Denmark has added Skagen anchorage inspections and Great Belt sulphur monitoring; enforcement is still tightening, the route is open. Scarborough Shoal: unchanged — no verified incident since the 1 August drills; still gray-zone coercion, no declared blockade.

On Hormuz, unnamed US officials claimed (Axios, 19 August) a southern corridor along Oman moving 15–20 tankers a night with outbound flows approaching 10 mb/d. Those are attributed claims without cargo-level verification. The cross-check: Kpler observed seven commodity ships transiting on 20 August — four in, three out, none a VLCC or LNG carrier — figures that exclude AIS-dark traffic. A southern route exists (JMIC identified one on 9 August); the volume moving through it is not independently established. A corridor claim is not the same thing as verified oil flow.

Status, stated plainly. Hormuz: NOT reopened; visible transits remain in single digits. Brent was near $93.44 and WTI near $86.76 on Thursday morning (Reuters), with the US diesel crack still near $100 after its 17 August record. Next review triggers: cargo-verified corridor volumes, a sustained return to double-digit daily visible transits, or a verified new attack on shipping or export infrastructure.

9 August 2026 — Hormuz talks advance — just as the Red Sea workaround is hit again

Two things moved today and they point in opposite directions. On Hormuz, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said the Iran–Oman shipping-lane agreement is in its final stages — but also that it would not by itself reopen the Strait, saying reopening depends on further US actions including compensation for attacks on Iran. Separately the IRGC said the Strait reopens when Washington accepts Iran’s conditions, and Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, secretary of Iran’s top national-security body, listed broader demands including lifting sanctions and the blockade and ending attacks on Iran and its regional allies. Three speakers, three different claims — reported separately rather than merged into one Iranian position.

Meanwhile the route around Hormuz was attacked. The Houthis said they struck Saudi Aramco’s 400,000 b/d Jazan refinery on the Red Sea coast with a drone, spokesman Yahya Saree calling the strike precise and framing it as a response to Saudi drone incursions over Saada and Hajjah. Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry confirmed a fire at the facility, said it was extinguished and reported no injuries — without stating a cause. The claim and the confirmation come from different parties; only the fire is officially established. The refinery had already been shut after the late-July attack.

Why the pairing matters more than either item alone. Jazan sits on the Red Sea side of Saudi Arabia’s workaround to Hormuz — the corridor that lets Aramco move refined product without transiting the strait. One chokepoint is negotiating a route back toward normal while the alternative corridor becomes less secure. That is what the market has to price, and Brent’s $83.55 close on Friday (+1.3%, Reuters) reflects a market still waiting for clarity rather than one that has resolved anything.

Status, stated plainly. Hormuz reopening: NOT AGREED. Iran–Oman shipping lanes: final stages, per Araqchi. Reopening conditions: unresolved. A lane design describes where ships would go if the strait reopened — not whether it will. Any headline reading “deal close” as “reopening imminent” is a misreading of what was actually said today.

8 August 2026 — Iran and Oman agree a route; eight vessels crossed

The negotiating pause below has produced something concrete. Iran says it has reached agreement with Oman on a proposed shipping route through Hormuz, with a joint statement in final drafting (Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei, 5 August, via Bloomberg). The reported framework routes inbound vessels near the Iranian side and outbound vessels down the Omani side, imposes no transit or service fees, and may include regional participation in demining; Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told IRNA it is a temporary route intended to run two to four months. Fortune reports (7 August) that the emerging deal recognises Iran’s control of the waterway. NPR called a partial reopening “close” on 6 August.

An agreed route is not a reopened strait. Kpler counted eight vessels crossing on 5 August — five tankers and three bulk carriers — against more than 100 a day before the conflict. That is the same order of magnitude as the single-digit weekends recorded on 27 July, so on the only metric that measures actual movement, nothing has yet changed. A return to normal tanker, LNG and container flows plausibly requires several consecutive weeks of incident-free transits, published routing protocols, credible mine clearance and a stable US–Iran political agreement — none of which is in place.

Futures have traded the negotiation rather than the flow: Brent hit a three-week low of $79.36 on 4 August, settled $79.45 on 5 August, then recovered to $83.55 on 7 August (+$1.06, +1.3%) as the terms of who would control the strait came back into doubt (Reuters). Friday’s settlement is the latest available; 8 August is a Saturday.

Provenance, so nothing is rolled forward silently. Two figures in the 2 August note below have not been refreshed and should not be read as current: the ~25 Bab el-Mandeb crossings, which was already a floor rather than a count because vessels run dark, and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan ~170–180,000 b/d flow against 750,000 b/d of reserved capacity. Both are dated 2 August and stand as of that date only. Note also that vessel counts and barrel-per-day flow estimates are different metrics measured by different methods — they are not interchangeable, and a recovery in one does not evidence a recovery in the other.

2 August 2026 — Negotiating pause at Hormuz; the water stays dangerous; Kirkuk–Ceyhan extended

President Trump says the planned strikes on Iranian energy targets are cancelled or postponed while Gulf governments try to complete a deal covering Iran’s nuclear programme and the “immediate, complete and total” reopening of Hormuz; Israel is said to have joined, Iran has not publicly accepted, and no verified reporting shows normal traffic resuming. The weekend produced two tanker incidents regardless: a vessel disabled by an unknown projectile off Limah (engine room hit, “not under command”), and a reported explosion close alongside a second tanker ~21nm north-west of Khasab — both unattributed. Hormuz is permitting, or failing to prevent, individual passages; Bab el-Mandeb improved to ~25 crossings but every count is a minimum with ships running dark; SUMED loadings have surged (Sidi Kerir 28.79M bbl for July, per Kpler via Reuters) even as a drone struck gas vessels at Damietta, and CPC has suspended loadings twice in a week. One durable positive: Turkey and Iraq extended the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline deal by a year — reserved capacity up to 750,000 b/d against ~170–180,000 flowing, a Mediterranean outlet for Iraqi crude that needs no strait transit, secured on conditions. A pause in the shooting is not a reopening of the sea.

27 July 2026 — The shooting has paused; the shipping crisis has not

Financial markets are pricing a pause; the physical system is not. Brent fell more than 6% on Monday to about $90.58 a barrel (WTI ~$83.51) after the US and Iran refrained from striking each other for a second consecutive day, with Oman and other intermediaries working to restore the interim ceasefire framework and negotiate Hormuz shipping arrangements — roughly $11 of war premium out since Brent reached about $102 on 23 July. But traffic through both chokepoints stayed severely depressed. Hormuz ran in single digits over the weekend — about seven commodity vessels Friday, three Saturday (all dark) and seven Sunday (Kpler) — so the strait has not meaningfully reopened. Bab el-Mandeb fell to just 11 crossings on Sunday (seven of them oil tankers), the lowest in months, after the Houthi strikes on Jizan and Yanbu, though several large VLCCs carrying Saudi, Emirati and Russian crude still escaped south toward Asia. Physical crude cargoes reached two-month highs last week and roughly 10 mb/d of Middle Eastern barrels may still be displaced. The signal has changed; the supply system has barely changed — market de-escalation without physical normalisation, with the US naval blockade still operating and the nuclear dispute unresolved.

21 July 2026 — Ceasefire collapses again; Houthis declare an embargo on all ships to Saudi ports

The interim 17 June truce has broken down and US strikes have run a tenth consecutive night (CENTCOM), with Iran striking a Kuwaiti power and desalination plant. The Red Sea threat is now concrete: in an email to shipowners seen by Bloomberg, Yemen’s Houthis warned their reimposed blockade covers all ships calling at Saudi ports — not just Saudi-flagged vessels — directly threatening Yanbu, the Red Sea outlet Saudi Arabia uses to bypass Hormuz. Enforcement is unproven, and a Saudi-led coalition says it has begun protective measures at Bab el-Mandeb. Hormuz itself runs at a near-halt — about four commodity vessels crossed Monday (Kpler), every one dark. Brent touched $91.42 Monday, its highest since 11 June, before easing to about $89 on hopes of a fresh ceasefire, while European low-sulphur gasoil hit a record premium near $60/bbl over Brent. The dated detail below remains the fuller background.

13–14 July 2026 — Both powers claim Hormuz: Iran declares it closed; the US drops its 20% toll but tightens a full Iran blockade

The US–Iran conflict has escalated sharply since the July ceasefire collapsed. Over the weekend Iran’s IRGC declared the Strait of Hormuz closed “until further notice” — after its forces struck the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy (engine-room fire, crew evacuated to a lifeboat, one crew member missing; CENTCOM). The US answered with further rounds of strikes, the latest on Sunday using one-way attack sea drones for the first time, and Iran retaliated across Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman — including the first strike on Gulf oil infrastructure in weeks, a Kuwaiti drilling facility. Oil jumped at Monday’s open, Brent trading above $79 and WTI near $74; by Tuesday Brent had pushed above $85, a four-week high, as the war premium returned in force.

On Monday the US hardened its claim over the strait: in a Truth Social post President Trump declared Hormuz “OPEN… with or without Iran,” reinstated a US blockade of Iranian ships and customers, styled the United States the “Guardian of the Hormuz Strait,” and proposed a 20% fee on all cargo transiting the waterway, the process to “begin immediately.” Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority countered that passage was “currently unfeasible” and suspended transit permits. Both powers now assert a right to control — and charge for — the chokepoint, days after the IMO Council ruled that transit through international straits may not be tolled. On Tuesday, after backlash from shippers and the IMO ruling, Trump abandoned the 20% fee — replacing it with a push for Gulf trade and investment deals — while keeping a full blockade on Iran-linked shipping (vessels to or from Iranian ports, or carrying Iranian cargo), which CENTCOM began enforcing that afternoon.

Iranian officials say a US projectile hit the perimeter area of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and Reuters has carried the perimeter claim — but there is no independent confirmation that the reactor itself was hit. Earlier IAEA and Reuters reporting on previous Bushehr incidents found no reactor damage or radiological release; no fresh IAEA confirmation has yet been seen for this latest strike.

Reuters ship-tracking found at least four oil and gas tankers reversed course near the strait; others continued to transit. The strait’s status is now openly contested — Iran declares it closed while the US and CENTCOM insist it stays open to lawful transit, and the JMIC says the Oman-coordinated southern lane remains available. The US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center has raised the transit threat to “severe” — up from “substantial,” its highest since mid-June — and the IMO Secretary-General has urged shipowners not to expose crews to unnecessary danger by transiting while safety cannot be assured. Brent spiked about 6% to near $80 as the fighting resumed, round-tripped to about $76 by Friday, then jumped back above $79 at Monday’s open and above $85 by Tuesday.

A fresh JMIC advisory (013-26, 10 July) keeps the threat level at “severe” but stresses the strait stays open: the southern transit route has been expanded and remains available to all traffic, coordination with NAVCENT’s NCAGS is offered but not mandatory, and — pointedly — “there is no controlling authority regulating passage or fee required for any route.” US NAVCENT added that “no nation has the authority to close or control the Strait of Hormuz,” with US forces prepared to defend freedom of navigation. Mariners are warned of a mine-danger area in the traditional traffic-separation scheme and to expect VHF hailing from naval forces.

War-risk insurance underlines the caution. Marsh, the world’s largest marine broker, says premiums to transit Hormuz now run 2–6% of a vessel’s value — up from a fraction of a percent before the war, having peaked near 10% at the height of the fighting (large no-claim discounts often trim the headline rate). Brokers report fewer requests for quotes since the ceasefire frayed this week, though cover remains available (Bloomberg, 9 Jul). The Lloyd’s Joint War Committee has listed the whole Gulf as high-risk since March — a listing that adds cost and a notification duty but does not bar transit.

On a second front, Ukraine’s drone campaign in the Sea of Azov has escalated sharply. Its Unmanned Systems Forces say they have struck Russian shadow-fleet shipping — the tankers that move sanctioned oil and products — across a nine-day operation, with Kyiv now putting the total at 116 vessels(an unverified claim; ~76, including 21 tankers, was the earlier multi-sourced count). In response Russia suspended shipping through the Kerch Strait and the Don–Azov Canal (FSB Border Service, from 10 July) and says it may divert to Black Sea and Baltic ports — a self-imposed chokepoint closure that cut Azov AIS traffic roughly55% (Starboard Maritime). With up to a quarter of Russian wheat exports transiting the Azov, Euronext wheat jumped about 4% to a six-week high. The IMO Secretary-General condemned the Azov and Black Sea attacks, warning the focus on Hormuz should not overshadow threats elsewhere; Russia’s Lavrov called them “terrorism,” while Kyiv says it strikes only military or war-supporting assets. Neither side’s figures are independently verified (Reuters, TWZ, gCaptain).

Sources: Reuters, WSJ, Bloomberg, JMIC 013-26, NAVCENT/NCAGS, Lloyd’s JWC, IMO, CENTCOM, UKMTO. Available footage and Tier-1 reporting attribute the “cancer” remark to Iran’s government and leadership — not the Iranian people, and not a call for their eradication.

Strait of Hormuz — Tanker Throughput

vs 2023 baseline

Vessel count · primary measure

4%of 2023 baseline

▼ down from ~26% peak (2026-07-07)

2026-05-262026-08-23

Transits

2/day

4% of 2023

Cargo

~0.2 mb/d

derived ×7.33

Capacity

1%

secondary · mix-sensitive

Tanker movements through Hormuz collapsed to zero at the height of the conflict, recovered to about 26% of the 2023 count baseline by 2026-07-07, and have since fallen back to about 4% in the seven days to 2026-08-23. PortWatch observed 17 tankers across that week; the 2023 average was 55.5/day.

Count is the headline because capacity is sensitive to vessel mix — at these volumes one large tanker can dominate a week's tonnage without a comparable change in the number of movements. Both figures are measured against PortWatch's own 2023 baseline for the same field.

Note: PortWatch publishes with a lag. This series ends 2026-08-23, 9 days before the last data refresh — so it describes the week to 2026-08-23, not today. Events since that date are not in these figures.

Read it as a floor. This is an AIS-based count, and a meaningful share of post-conflict Hormuz traffic runs with transponders off (dark transit) or via evasive routing — so true movement is likely higher than the figure shown.

Aggregate strait transits (all tankers, all origins) — not by-country loadings or empty-tanker inflows, which require paid vessel intelligence. mb/d derived from cargo tonnage at 7.33 bbl/tonne.

Source: IMF PortWatch · satellite-AIS chokepoint transits · latest 2026-08-23

Strait of Hormuz — Force Posture

Operation Epic Fury · reported, not live positions

US / Coalition

  • Carrier strike groupsconfirmed

    The U.S. briefly surged three aircraft carriers into the Middle East in April — Ford, Lincoln and George H.W. Bush — per CENTCOM-cited reporting at the time (the first three-carrier presence there since 2003). By July, open-source fleet trackers and Navy releases point to a two-carrier posture in the Arabian Sea, centred on USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, with amphibious big-deck ships (Tripoli, Boxer) also in the region. USS Gerald R. Ford returned to Norfolk on 16 May after an 11-month deployment and is not part of the July posture.

    USNI Fleet & Marine Tracker (7 Jul) · Navy releases (11 Jul) · Breaking Defense (Apr) · AP (Ford return) · confirmed 11 Jul

  • Freedom-of-navigation postureconfirmed

    CENTCOM states the strait is open to lawful transit and its forces are positioned to ensure it (“Iran does not control the strait. Traffic is flowing.”). After thirteen consecutive nights of strikes on Iranian coastal military targets, US strikes paused from 25 July and had held for a second consecutive day by the 27th while Oman-brokered diplomacy proceeds; the US naval blockade of Iran-linked shipping remains in force. “Open,” though, has not meant “normal” — Hormuz traffic is still running at single digits a day.

    CENTCOM / Washington Times · confirmed 27 Jul

  • Mine countermeasuresconfirmed

    US naval mine-clearance missions reported in the strait; President Trump has instructed the Navy to fire on Iranian vessels caught laying mines.

    CENTCOM reporting · confirmed 12 Jul

Iran (IRGC Navy / IRIN)

  • Fast-attack craft (swarm)assessed

    Large inventory of small fast-attack craft (Zolfaghar- and Peykaap-class) built for asymmetric hit-and-run swarm tactics — speed, dispersion and saturation to surround a vessel; armed with heavy machine guns, rockets and short-range anti-ship missiles.

    IISS / CNN ‘mosquito fleet’ · confirmed 8 May

  • Coastal anti-ship missilesassessed

    Coastal ASCM batteries and craft-mounted missiles — e.g. the short-range Nasr-1 and the Zafar (≈250 km, subsonic, INS/GPS) — designed to salvo against merchant and naval vessels transiting the strait.

    Strauss Center / US ONI · confirmed 15 May

  • Naval minesassessed

    Substantial sea-mine inventory — the classic Hormuz-closure tool and the trigger for the US mine-clearance operations now under way.

    Strauss Center · confirmed 12 Jul

  • Submarines & recent activityassessed

    IRGC Navy has put submarines and fast boats into the strait (Maritime Security Belt 2026 exercise) and has attacked commercial vessels with fast-attack craft in recent weeks.

    Army Recognition / reporting · confirmed 11 Jul

  • Key basesassessed

    Bandar Abbas (principal IRGCN/IRIN base) and Jask, plus dispersed coastal sites along the northern shore of the strait.

    Strauss Center · confirmed 1 Jun

Recent incidents · from the crisis timeline

Full chronology: Strait of Hormuz crisis timeline →

Reported open-source posture — approximate, drawn from public agency statements, wire reporting and reference works, NOT live tactical positions. Exact locations and counts are not publicly confirmed and change constantly. 'Confirmed' = stated in official/agency reporting; 'Assessed' = analyst or reference estimate (e.g. IISS, ONI, CSIS).

This posture snapshot was last updated 37 days ago and may be behind the current situation.

Chokepoint Transit Monitor

Tanker tonnage (DWT) vs 2023 baseline · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)
Oil Route StressSevere

Strait of Hormuz tanker tonnage is at 1% of normal, with Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal also restricted.

Crude- and product-carrying capacity actually moving through each chokepoint — weighted by tanker size (a VLCC isn’t a coastal product tanker).

Strait of HormuzAIS low
2.4/day tankers · 5/day all vessels
1%
severely restricted
Bab el-Mandeb StraitAIS low
9.7/day tankers · 29.4/day all vessels
27%
depressed
Suez Canal
16.4/day tankers · 42/day all vessels
47%
depressed
Bosporus Strait
19.6/day tankers · 69/day all vessels
73%
near normal
Panama Canal
12.4/day tankers · 26.7/day all vessels
90%
near normal
Cape of Good Hope
20.1/day tankers · 91.6/day all vessels
129%
elevated (diversion)

Latest data 2026-08-23 (≈10 days ago) — PortWatch reports in arrears, so it confirms shifts after the fact, not in real time. The % is tanker capacity (DWT) vs the 2023 daily average (trailing 7-day); ship counts shown for context. Lanes marked AIS low are conflict zones where spoofing, jamming or vessels going dark mean these figures are a floor — a significant share of Hormuz traffic runs with transponders off, so true movement is likely higher. Source: IMF PortWatch — estimated from satellite AIS, not customs data. PortWatch does not tell us the exact barrel, grade or buyer — only whether the ships needed to move the oil economy are actually moving.

Port Oil-Flow Monitor

Tanker import/export vs 2023 baseline · IMF PortWatch (AIS estimates)

Crude and product moving through major hubs — daily tanker tonnage in (↓) and out (↑), with how it compares to the 2023 average. Where the barrels are actually going.

UK & NW Europe

🇳🇱
Rotterdam
401 in · ↑ 103 out kt/d · net import
91%
near 2023
🇧🇪
Antwerp
81 in · ↑ 72 out kt/d · balanced
69%
below 2023
🇬🇧
Fawley
35 in · ↑ 11 out kt/d · net import
91%
near 2023
🇬🇧
Milford Haven
13 in · ↑ 26 out kt/d · net export
52%
below 2023
🇬🇧
Immingham
18 in · ↑ 12 out kt/d · net import
71%
below 2023
🇬🇧
Grangemouth
7 in · ↑ 0 out kt/d · net import
64%
below 2023

Global oil hubs

🇺🇸
Houston
74 in · ↑ 445 out kt/d · net export
120%
near 2023
🇷🇺
Novorossiysk
0 in · ↑ 173 out kt/d · net export
136%
above 2023
🇦🇪
Fujairah
52 in · ↑ 88 out kt/d · net export
65%
below 2023

Latest data 2026-08-21 (PortWatch reports ~a week in arrears — it confirms shifts after the fact, not in real time). Volumes in thousand tonnes/day (kt/d), trailing 7-day average vs 2023. Source: IMF PortWatch — tanker tonnage estimated from satellite AIS, not customs data; some terminals (e.g. Gulf export ports) are under-covered and read low.

Live Sea State — Oil Shipping Chokepoints

Significant wave height, wave period, and 10-metre wind speed. Updated 1 Sept, 20:09 UTC.

CalmModerateRoughDangerous

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Calm

0.26m

wave height

3.9s

period

5kt · g6ESE

wind

Bab el-Mandeb

Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

Calm

0.38m

wave height

4.5s

period

10kt · g14NW

wind

Suez Approaches (Port Said)

Eastern Mediterranean

Calm

0.36m

wave height

3.3s

period

5kt · g9NNE

wind

English Channel (Dover Strait)

NW Europe

Moderate

0.72m

wave height

3.8s

period

15kt · g20WSW

wind

Skagerrak

North Sea / Baltic

Rough

1.52m

wave height

5.0s

period

22kt · g29W

wind

Source: Open-Meteo Marine + Forecast APIs (sourced from European met agencies). Risk band uses Douglas-style sea-state (wave height) and Beaufort-style wind thresholds; whichever is worse sets the band. open-meteo.com ↗

War-Risk Watch

Editorial · updated weekly

JWC Listed Areas — high risk

Strait of HormuzPersian / Arabian GulfGulf of OmanGulf of AdenIndian Ocean (Somali HRA)Southern Red Sea / Bab-el-MandebBlack SeaSea of AzovGulf of GuineaLibyan watersYemeni waters

Latest list change (2026-03-03): JWC circular JWLA-033 (3 March 2026) added Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar to listed areas and amended the broader Persian/Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Southern Red Sea zone. No areas have been removed since.

Premium readings (publicly cited)

  • Persian / Mideast Gulf transitw/w broadly stable
    around 1% of hull value per voyage
    S&P Global Commodity Insights; Marsh McLennan; Reuters (Mar–Jun 2026)
  • Strait of Hormuz — voyage-specificw/w voyage-dependent
    higher and volatile; quoted as high as ~3% during peak March tension, ~0.8% on successful transits after no-claims adjustments
    Reuters (March 2026); S&P Global
  • Sea of Azov / Kerch Straitw/w sharply higher
    route effectively shut — Russia suspended Kerch Strait & Don–Azov Canal transit (from 10 Jul) after a nine-day Ukrainian drone campaign against the shadow fleet; Kyiv claims 116 vessels hit (~76 multi-sourced, incl. 21 tankers), Azov AIS traffic down ~55%
    Reuters, TWZ, gCaptain, Starboard Maritime (Jul 2026)

Current reading: Cover is still being written in the London market — the Lloyd's Market Association reports war-risk insurance remains available — but terms have hardened and pricing now turns voyage by voyage as the US–Iran war intensifies around Hormuz. Both Washington and Tehran now claim to control the strait: Iran demands permits and has called passage 'currently unfeasible,' while President Trump has floated a 20% US toll on all Hormuz cargo (the IMO Council has ruled transit through international straits may not be tolled, and no US collection mechanism exists yet). Brent has jumped above $85, transits have thinned to a five-week low, and AIS-dark crossings are rising. A second, self-inflicted chokepoint has opened in the north: after Ukrainian drones struck ~76 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov (including 21 tankers of the sanctioned shadow fleet), Russia suspended the Kerch Strait and Don–Azov Canal — hull risk on Black Sea/Azov shadow-fleet tankers is now acute. Two of the world's contested waterways are impaired at once, for unrelated reasons.

Watch next: The signals that matter now: whether Trump's 20% Hormuz toll moves from declaration toward any executive order or collection mechanism; confirmation or denial of Iranian permit/fee enforcement; whether Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia (Abha, the first since the 2022 truce) shift from airports to oil facilities — the spare-capacity buffer holding the price; the pace of Ukrainian Azov strikes and any Russian reopening of the Kerch Strait; and further insurer/JWC action (a possible JWLA-034 circular) confirming a fresh hardening.

Premium ranges aggregated from publicly-cited figures in news sources; exact rates are confidential between brokers and underwriters. JWC Listed Areas from Lloyd's Joint War Committee circular JWLA-033 (3 March 2026). Editorial reading is our market interpretation, not a republished source. Updated 14 Jul 2026.

Current Route Status — 1 September 2026

Status reflects current editorial assessment based on publicly available information. Risk levels: Normal · Elevated · High · Critical

🌍

Seismic Signals — M5.0+ Past 7 Days

Source: USGS →

M5.0+ earthquakes near oil infrastructure regions: Middle East & Gulf, North Africa, Caspian, Caucasus, North Sea, Southern Europe. Shallow quakes (<70km) near refineries carry highest operational risk.

🔥

Thermal Anomalies — Major Refineries & Terminals

No thermal anomalies detected near tracked 24 major EU and Gulf refineries / terminals in the past 24 hours.

NASA FIRMS VIIRS satellite detections within ~15 km of 24 major EU and Gulf refineries / terminals. Past 24 h. High Fire Radiative Power near a facility may indicate flaring, fire, or process incident — not all detections indicate incidents.

Bunker Fuel Prices

Ship & Bunker →
RotterdamARA
NW Europe
VLSFO
$628/mt 30.3
MGO
$748/mt 30.3
FujairahFUJA
Middle East
VLSFO
$643/mt 30.3
MGO
$763/mt 30.3
SingaporeSING
Asia-Pacific
VLSFO
$636/mt 30.3
MGO
$758/mt 30.3

Derived from Brent, not live market quotes. Formula: VLSFO ≈ Brent × 6.5 + 10, MGO ≈ Brent × 6.5 + 130 (basis $95.15/bbl). During supply disruptions, real physical bunker prices for prompt delivery typically run substantially higher than this — see Ship & Bunker or Bunker Index for actual market quotes. VLSFO = IMO 2020 compliant very low sulphur fuel oil. MGO = marine gas oil (ECA-grade).

Bunker Prices — Historical Trend

Estimated from Brent crude benchmark. VLSFO = IMO 2020 low-sulphur fuel oil. MGO = marine gas oil.

Active Disruption Risk

Strait of Hormuz

Persian Gulf / Gulf of Oman

Critical — tanker tonnage at 1% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Indirect / price impact

Daily flow

~20 mb/d

Location

Between Iran and Oman, connecting Persian Gulf to Arabian Sea

The Strait of Hormuz remains the master variable for global oil. After the conflict that began in late February 2026 effectively closed it, the EIA assumed Hormuz stayed shut into late May, with traffic only beginning to pick up in June. Iran now says the strait will reopen only under new conditions — including possible transit fees set with Oman — which Washington opposes and Oman has reportedly declined to support. Iran describes the strait as open, but in practice only a handful of crude, product and LNG vessels have exited recently — often with AIS gaps or under heightened risk — while overall Gulf flows stay far below normal. Open on paper, restricted in practice.

UK Impact

Approximately 20% of global seaborne oil and LNG normally transits Hormuz. The IEA put Gulf output affected by the closure around 14.4 mb/d below pre-war levels, with total supply losses since February of roughly 12.8 mb/d — which it has called the largest disruption on record. Even as paper prices ease on diplomacy headlines, physical crude stays tight, keeping Atlantic Basin premiums elevated and UK import costs for diesel, jet fuel and heating oil under pressure. Scotland, with no domestic refining capacity since Grangemouth's closure, remains maximally exposed.

Hormuz is Washington's top priority and Tehran's main leverage in unresolved US–Iran talks, alongside sanctions, frozen funds and nuclear limits. The early-June Israeli strike on Iran's Mahshahr petrochemical complex — the first hit on Iranian energy infrastructure since the April ceasefire — put a direct energy-asset risk premium back on top of the chokepoint risk. Even after a reopening, recovery is slow: Kuwait says it could restore about 70% of output within 6–8 weeks, with the remainder taking roughly another month. The Red Sea/Suez route remains independently disrupted by Houthi attacks.

Suez Canal

Egypt — Red Sea to Mediterranean

High — tanker tonnage down to 47% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Moderate UK impact

Daily flow

~5.5 mb/d

Location

Northeast Egypt, connecting Red Sea (via Gulf of Suez) to Mediterranean

The Suez Canal carries around 5.5 mb/d of oil and petroleum products plus significant LNG volumes. Houthi attacks have kept the Red Sea route effectively closed to most commercial tankers since late 2023, and Cape of Good Hope diversion is now the near-permanent operating norm for Gulf-to-Europe cargoes. Canal transit volumes remain far below pre-disruption levels.

UK Impact

Cape routing adds 10–14 days and substantial freight cost to UK-bound cargoes from the Middle East and Asia. This remains embedded in import costs. With Hormuz still constrained, both primary Gulf export corridors remain under simultaneous pressure — the compound squeeze on UK diesel, jet fuel and heating oil availability persists.

The Sumed pipeline can carry approximately 2.5 mb/d of crude as a bypass but not refined products. UK and European refiners have largely adapted sourcing to Atlantic Basin and North Sea suppliers, but at higher cost. A resolution to Houthi attacks remains the necessary condition for Suez Canal volumes to recover.

Bab-el-Mandeb Strait

Yemen / Djibouti — Red Sea entrance

Critical — MARAD 2026-006: Houthi Attacks on Commercial VesselsModerate UK impact

Daily flow

~4.5 mb/d

Location

Between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea, connecting Gulf of Aden to Red Sea

The southern entrance to the Red Sea remains actively disrupted by Houthi attacks since November 2023. Around 4.5 mb/d of oil and products normally transits this route. The shipping industry continues to largely avoid Bab-el-Mandeb, with daily traffic far below pre-attack levels. With Hormuz also still constrained, both primary Gulf-to-UK export corridors remain under simultaneous pressure.

UK Impact

UK-relevant shipping continues to route via the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10,000+ nautical miles and 10–14 days to Middle Eastern cargo journeys. With Hormuz constrained at the same time, both disruptions overlapping represent the most severe supply-corridor constraint since the 1973 oil embargo. Scotland remains entirely reliant on import routes with no domestic refining capacity since Grangemouth's closure.

Operation Prosperity Guardian has not restored normal transit confidence. Insurance premiums for Red Sea passage remain prohibitively elevated. The Houthi threat is geopolitically linked to the broader US-Iran-Israel conflict; renewed Houthi threats in the Red Sea are an active watch-item alongside the constrained Hormuz corridor. Red Sea normalisation requires a separate Houthi ceasefire.

Reviewed 1 Sept 2026

South China Sea — Scarborough Shoal

West Philippines Sea / South China Sea

High — active gray-zone coercion; no declared blockadeIndirect / price impact

Daily flow

~3.4 mb/d

Location

Scarborough Shoal, approximately 220km west of the Philippines, within the broader South China Sea corridor

Reclassified 11 August 2026 from a latent territorial dispute to an active gray-zone flashpoint. Chinese control at Scarborough Shoal is being exercised through coast guard presence, episodic barriers, water-cannon and blocking operations, administrative measures and joint drills. Satellite analysis in April showed ships and a floating barrier tightening control of the shoal's entrance; a floating platform seen around late May was subsequently removed, so no permanent structure should be described as established. On 23 and 24 July, Philippine government vessels were subjected to Chinese Coast Guard water cannon on consecutive days, with a Chinese vessel closing to roughly 7 metres of a Philippine fisheries vessel and creating a collision risk. China confirmed it had imposed what it called lawful control measures — warnings, blocking and water cannon; Manila called the actions dangerous and unlawful. On 1 August, Chinese military and coast guard forces conducted joint air and naval combat drills around the shoal, alongside announced stronger administration of the nature reserve created there in 2025, regular coast guard patrols and strengthened enforcement. The wider sea lane carries approximately 3.4 mb/d of oil — primarily Middle Eastern crude transiting to China, Japan and South Korea — along with significant LNG volumes.

UK Impact

The South China Sea does not sit on the primary UK supply route, but its disruption feeds into UK fuel markets through displaced demand. If Chinese and East Asian buyers cannot secure normal Gulf supply volumes, they compete more aggressively for Atlantic Basin, West African, and North Sea cargoes — the same pool UK refiners and importers draw on. With Hormuz still constrained, Gulf supply to Asia is already severely limited — a South China Sea escalation would further intensify competition for alternative supply and amplify UK import cost pressure.

Two boundaries are being held deliberately. First, the systemic trigger is NOT met: as of 11 August 2026 there is no declared blockade or quarantine and no verified armed exchange of fire at Scarborough. The observed state has been upgraded without promoting it into the full South China Sea cascade scenario, and earlier wording describing an established blockade here has been withdrawn as unverified. Second, the legal position needs care. Sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal itself has not been adjudicated — the 2016 arbitration did not award territorial sovereignty to the Philippines. What it did do was reject key Chinese maritime claims and find China's blockade of traditional fishing access unlawful; Beijing rejects the award. The stand-off has drawn US statements under the Mutual Defense Treaty. A full closure of the broader South China Sea to commercial traffic would rank among the most severe supply shocks in modern history, which is why the distinction between coercion below the threshold and a declared closure is worth maintaining precisely. Rechecked 21 August 2026: no new incident at the shoal has been verified since the 1 August joint drills; the late-July water-cannon operations remain the latest verified escalation. The 11 August reclassification stands unchanged — active gray-zone coercion, no declared blockade, systemic trigger not met. Next review: any verified blockade or quarantine declaration, exchange of fire, or interference with commercial tanker traffic in the wider corridor.

Elevated — Worth Monitoring

Danish Straits

Denmark / Sweden — Baltic Sea access

Elevated — open and functioning; enforcement and navigation-safety risk risingModerate UK impact

Daily flow

~3 mb/d

Location

Between Denmark and Sweden, connecting Baltic Sea to North Sea

The Danish Straits (Øresund, Great Belt, Little Belt) are the only maritime access to the Baltic Sea. Around 3 mb/d of Russian oil exports — primarily crude and oil products from Baltic ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Kaliningrad) — transited this route before Western sanctions. Post-sanctions, the mix has shifted but Baltic tanker traffic remains significant.

UK Impact

Reduced but not eliminated. Russian oil products previously accounted for a significant share of UK diesel imports. Post-2022 sanctions have redirected UK supply to Middle Eastern and US sources. The Danish Straits remain relevant as a conduit for Norwegian and other Baltic energy flows.

Re-baselined 11 August 2026. There is no verified closure, general transit ban, or material route-throughput disruption attributable to Danish action — the route is open and functioning. What has changed is the enforcement and safety environment around it. Danish Maritime Authority sanctions material, updated through 24 July 2026, applies extensive restrictions to EU-designated vessels: they are generally barred from EU ports, anchorage zones and locks, and from services including insurance, bunkering, crew changes, cargo handling and tug services. Those provisions are framed around ports, services and designated vessels rather than as a blanket prohibition on passage, and pilotage can still be supplied for safety reasons. The legal position matters here and is frequently overstated: Denmark's UNCLOS declaration invokes Article 35(c) for the special regime governing the Great Belt, Little Belt and the Danish part of the Sound, developed from the 1857 Copenhagen Treaty, and states that the existing regime remains unchanged. Any claim that Denmark could simply close the Straits to a whole class of foreign shipping therefore needs far more legal qualification than ordinary sanctions enforcement. Against that, the threat environment has clearly deteriorated: in January, Denmark and other North Sea and Baltic coastal states formally warned of growing navigation-system interference and increased maritime-safety risk, and Danish maritime sanctions were tightened again in April and July 2026, including further restrictions involving tankers and LNG carriers. NATO membership of Denmark and Sweden and the proximity of Baltic submarine-cable incidents continue to raise strategic sensitivity, and shadow-fleet tankers still transit regularly. A Danish closure remains a scenario, not an observed state: risk has risen, the chokepoint has not triggered. Rechecked 21 August 2026: enforcement has tightened further rather than eased. Denmark has announced strengthened environmental oversight of tankers at the Skagen anchorage — funded in the 2026 finance act, with environmental ship inspectors joining port-state-control boardings — plus sulphur-'sniffer' monitoring on the Great Belt Bridge through year-end; shadow-fleet transits continue at roughly 175 tankers a month. Mid-August reports of a Russian frigate deployment near Fehmarn remain single-source and are not carried here as established. The 11 August re-baseline stands: elevated, open and functioning, with enforcement and navigation-safety risk still rising. Next review: any Danish detention or refusal action against a transiting tanker, a further DMA sanctions update, or a verified naval incident in or near the Straits.

Turkish Straits

Turkey — Black Sea to Mediterranean

Elevated — tanker tonnage at 73% of the 2023 norm (live · IMF PortWatch)Indirect / price impact

Daily flow

~2.4 mb/d

Location

Bosphorus and Dardanelles, connecting Black Sea to Aegean Sea

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits control access between the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Around 2.4 mb/d passes through, primarily Kazakhstani crude via the CPC pipeline and Russian Black Sea exports. Turkey has periodically restricted tanker passage, citing insurance and safety requirements linked to Western price cap sanctions on Russian oil.

UK Impact

Indirect. Price cap compliance disputes have caused periodic delays to Kazakh crude exports, tightening Mediterranean crude markets and creating knock-on price effects. UK supply is not directly routed via the Turkish Straits, but European refinery economics are affected.

Turkey controls passage under the 1936 Montreux Convention. Russia has contested Western price cap enforcement in these waters. Insurance requirements for tankers carrying sanctioned oil have been a recurring flashpoint.

Reviewed 23 Aug 2026

Normal Conditions

North Sea / UKCS

UK Continental Shelf

Normal — active structural decline (2025: ~1.1m boe/d)Direct UK impact

Daily flow

~1.1 mb/d

Location

UK Continental Shelf, Norwegian Sea, north to Shetland Basin

North Sea production from the UK Continental Shelf peaked in 1999 and has declined since. The NSTA's 2025 production-efficiency results, published 6 August 2026, put average daily UKCS production at approximately 1.1m boe/d in 2025, totalling 401m boe for the year — a figure that supersedes the ~1.3m boe/d previously carried here. Operating performance improved rather than deteriorated: production efficiency rose to 76%, adding roughly 21,000 boe/d over what would otherwise have been produced. That mitigates the decline at the margin without reversing it. NSTA Wells Insights (11 August 2026) shows the same mixed picture, in the NSTA's own description: 56 reinstated wells contributed an additional 16m boe in 2025, while the UKCS well stock fell 7% to 2,298 — 1,439 operating, 558 shut in — and no exploration wells were drilled at all in 2025, against three in 2024. The NSTA currently forecasts some exploration and appraisal drilling returning across 2026–28. Petroineos ceased refinery operations at Grangemouth in April 2025; the site now operates as an import and fuels distribution terminal.

UK Impact

Direct. North Sea crude is the UK's primary domestic oil source, reducing import dependence. Scotland now has no operating refinery — all refined fuels arrive via import, increasing exposure to global supply disruptions. With Hormuz still constrained (open on paper but restricted in practice as of June 2026) and Red Sea disruption ongoing, and no domestic Scottish refining capacity, Scotland remains exposed to any renewed Gulf supply shock.

Policy has not moved in a way that overturns the structural assessment. The North Sea Future Plan retains existing fields for their lifetimes while ending new licences to explore new fields. The new Transitional Energy Certificates are specifically for already-discovered acreage in or adjacent to existing fields and tiebacks — they are not new exploration licences, and should not be reported as a reopening of exploration. One widely misread data point needs care: August 2026 was the first month in LSEG records going back to 2007 with no Brent-stream cargo initially scheduled. That concerns the Brent grade itself, not North Sea output. The other four BFOET grades continued loading, at around 474,000 b/d combined in August, and Brent had averaged only about 23,000 b/d across 2026 beforehand. The September programme restores a Brent-stream cargo of roughly 23,000 b/d, so the zero is a depletion milestone for one ageing grade, not evidence that the North Sea export system stopped functioning, and it must not be carried forward as a current state. Long-range projections have now been taken directly from the NSTA's February 2026 tables rather than restated from the superseded October 2024 vintage — and the familiar figures turn out to have understated the decline. On combined oil and net gas, the February 2026 projection runs 59.5 mtoe in 2025 (1.09m boe/d, which independently corroborates the ~1.1m boe/d outturn) to 35.2 mtoe by 2030, 20.2 by 2035, 11.7 by 2040 and 4.1 by 2050. That is a fall of about 41% by 2030 and about 93% by 2050 against 2025 — steeper than the roughly one-third by 2030 and ~85% by 2050 previously in circulation, both of which came from the October 2024 projection. The direction of the assessment is unchanged; the magnitude is larger. Rechecked 21 August 2026: the NSTA's Decommissioning Cost and Performance Update, published 13 August, adds a cost-side datum — decommissioning work covered 257 wells in 2025, 114 of them progressed to full abandonment, and the estimate for remaining UKCS decommissioning edged down from £43.6bn to £43.4bn — and leading operators have backed the NSTA's well-decommissioning charter. These clarify the picture without changing it: the structural-decline assessment above remains current and its direction is unchanged. Unresolved: whether the forecast return of exploration and appraisal drilling across 2026–28 materialises after 2025 recorded no exploration wells at all. Next review: the NSTA's September releases, the next DESNZ Energy Trends, or any disruption at the Grangemouth import terminal.

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About this page

This page provides an editorial assessment of key oil supply routes and their current status. Flow volumes are approximate figures from IEA and EIA public data. Risk assessments reflect publicly available information and are updated periodically — this is not a live or automated feed.

For authoritative supply data, see EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints and the IEA.

For EU-wide reserve data, see EuroOilWatch →