Global Disruption Status

Energy, shipping and food-security risks tracked as one compounding system, from the Strait of Hormuz to Europe’s rivers. This board shows the current position of each corridor; every entry’s complete sourced-and-dated evidence record is preserved in the evidence history.

Global disruption: SEVERE

Latest corridor review 10 September 2026

Hormuz traffic is near a standstill; alternative Red Sea routes are becoming costlier; Novorossiysk has reopened after a short interruption.

3 of 19 corridors verified on the latest review date. Individual checks range from 30 July 2026 to 10 September 2026; each card below carries its own verification date.

Current status · Evidence history — the board tells you what is true now; the chronology shows how the assessment got there.

The order helps readers find the most consequential current developments; it is not a numerical risk ranking.

Strait of Hormuz

critical · deterioratingNo state change

CENTCOM says it destroyed five Iranian crude carriers on 8 September, four in the Gulf of Oman, one near Kharg Island, after two IRGC missile attempts on a US warship; Iran’s retaliation claims are unverified. Kpler’s 10-day average is ~13 transits/day against an 85/day baseline — severely disrupted, not closed, and observed counts remain a floor, not total throughput.

  • CENTCOM says it struck Kaviz, Charminar, Horizon 1, Riesco and Derya on 8 September.
  • Kpler’s 10-day average is ~13 transits/day against an 85/day pre-crisis baseline.
  • Iranian claims of attacks on US-linked vessels remain unverified.

UK relevance: Continued disruption sustains British freight, fuel and inflation pressure, now with oil-export logistics and the Red Sea fallback both under attack.

Watch next: Whether Kharg loading infrastructure itself becomes a target; whether outbound crude movements deteriorate further; and whether overall transit counts remain near 13/day or fall again.

Last verified 10 September 2026View full chronology

Red Sea & Bab el-Mandeb

critical · deteriorating

Fighting has reached the approaches to the strait: Houthi forces are reported close to control of Mocha and Dhubab, with more than 300 killed in days of fighting and the UN envoy warning of wider war. The Jazan refinery and a bulk fuel plant were struck, and routing displaced from Hormuz makes disruption here compound rather than substitute.

  • Houthi forces reported close to control of Mocha and Dhubab on Bab el-Mandeb.
  • More than 300 killed in days of fighting; UN envoy warns of wider war.
  • Jazan Aramco refinery and a bulk fuel plant struck; Houthis claim retaliation.

UK relevance: The Red Sea–Suez leg is the main workaround moving Gulf barrels toward the markets the UK buys from, so its extra costs feed delivered fuel prices.

Watch next: Whether Houthi control of the coast translates into interdiction of transiting traffic; whether damage or operational disruption at Jazan persists; and whether additional pressure shifts Saudi export reliance toward Yanbu and Sidi Kerir.

Last verified 10 September 2026View full chronology

Black Sea logistics

elevated · deterioratingResolved

Novorossiysk resumed operations on Sunday 16 August after an interruption of roughly two days — 700,000 b/d was exposed capacity, not a realised continuing loss. Damage at Odesa and Chornomorsk, and the halving of Black Sea deliveries to Turkey, stand.

  • Reviewed 24 August: no material change identified since 17 August.
  • Turkey’s ~200,000-tonne August projection unchanged; scheduled tankers carry Kazakh KEBCO.
  • Reports of restricted berth capacity at Novorossiysk could not be dated after 17 August.

UK relevance: Black Sea disruption tightens the European product and grain balances that set prices the UK imports.

Watch next: Whether Novorossiysk loadings hold and the projected ~200,000-tonne August arrivals in Turkey materialise.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

European rivers

elevated

Low water has moved from freight to power: Romania’s last Danube-cooled reactor disconnected on 13 August, Paks runs at roughly 25% of capacity, and Hungary is preparing to sink two barges and build a riverbed sill to raise the water. The Rhine has set record lows.

  • Cernavodă Unit 2 disconnected 13 August — Romania’s entire nuclear baseload offline.
  • Hungary: two 80-metre barges may lift the Danube ~20cm at Paks; a sill perhaps up to a metre.
  • Kaub read 9cm provisionally on 18 August (ELWIS), below 4 August’s 21cm — record low if confirmed.

UK relevance: European power and freight strain raises the imported energy and goods costs that reach UK consumers.

Watch next: MetDesk sees potential cooler, wetter conditions in south-eastern Europe around mid-August; until then restrictions extend.

Last verified 18 August 2026View full chronology

Oil products

critical

Crude has round-tripped — Brent near $89 is about where July ended — while products keep tightening: European diesel margins rose nearly 10% in a session and US ULSD settled at $4.19/gal. A conversion-and-delivery crisis rather than crude scarcity.

  • Brent settled $87.72 on 10 August, above $89 Tuesday — still some 11% below July’s high.
  • European diesel refining margins rose nearly 10% on Monday 10 August.
  • EIA’s physical Brent was $88.90 on 3 August against an $83.77 futures settle — the physical premium persists.

UK relevance: Product tightness, not crude, is the channel that reaches UK pump, freight and heating costs fastest.

Watch next: One analyst quoted by Reuters expects Brent to swing broadly between $80 and $100 as the conflict escalates and de-escalates.

Last verified 11 August 2026View full chronology

Russian refining

critical

Repeated Ukrainian strikes have cut Russian refinery runs — Ryazan halted, about a third of Perm’s capacity offline — while Russia extends fuel-export restrictions and imports petrol across four borders. The 10 August Taneco strike was the deepest and deadliest yet; its processing loss is unquantified.

  • Taneco (Nizhnekamsk) struck 10 August, ~1,200km deep; 13 killed, 78 wounded; not listed as stopped.
  • Gasoline export ban runs to 31 January 2027; diesel-side restrictions gain producer exemptions from 1 September.
  • Diesel and gasoil exports fell to ~234,000 b/d in early July versus a 2025 average near 817,000 (Kpler).

UK relevance: Lost Russian refining removes diesel from the global pool a net-diesel-importing UK buys from.

Watch next: Plant-by-plant damage assessments — Taneco and Saratov join the loss list only when processing losses are confirmed.

Last verified 11 August 2026View full chronology

Global diesel

critical

European diesel margins reached a record $74.66/bbl and rose nearly 10% again on 10 August after the Taneco and Jazan strikes; European diesel inventories are the thinnest since 2022, ARA product stocks the lowest since 2014, and Rhine low water raises inland delivery costs.

  • Margins moved immediately after two refinery attacks in one weekend.
  • India is the emergency swing supplier — Reliance shipped roughly 4.2–5 million barrels to Europe in July.
  • Barging diesel inland from Rotterdam costs the most since Bloomberg’s records began in 2009.

UK relevance: Diesel is the fast transmission channel into UK trucking, farming and food distribution — fuel the UK imports rather than refines.

Watch next: August competition between Europe and Asia for Indian diesel cargoes.

Last verified 11 August 2026View full chronology

Middle East conflict

critical · deteriorating

Renewed direct Saudi–Houthi exchange materially expands the active conflict: Saudi airstrikes across Yemen have drawn Houthi drone and missile retaliation against Saudi energy infrastructure. US–Iran exchange now extends to oil-export logistics, with five Iranian crude carriers reported destroyed on 8 September, so the August negotiating pause no longer describes the situation.

  • Renewed direct Saudi–Houthi exchange materially expands the active conflict.
  • Houthis say seven were killed in a Saudi strike on a Yemeni prison.
  • US–Iran exchange now reaches oil-export logistics, not only naval targets.

UK relevance: Any strike on Gulf oil or gas infrastructure would feed directly into the import prices the UK pays for fuel.

Watch next: Whether attacks expand to Persian Gulf-side energy infrastructure or loading terminals, and whether any negotiating track re-forms around Hormuz.

Last verified 10 September 2026View full chronology

Arctic / Northern Sea Route

elevated

Roughly 8 million barrels of Russian crude were transiting or staged for the Northern Sea Route within weeks of the season opening, with nearly twenty tankers routed north of 81°N and three nuclear icebreakers escorting — a seasonal, escort-dependent corridor now carrying concentrated value.

  • About 60% of last season’s entire four-month volume departed in the opening weeks (gCaptain/MagicPort).
  • Nearly twenty tankers routed north of Severnaya Zemlya, within ~500 nautical miles of the Pole.
  • The tanker Aria reversed course on 31 July, possibly on heavy ice ahead.

UK relevance: The route’s seasonal limits cap one of the few detours easing pressure on the corridors that set the prices the UK imports at.

Watch next: Ice closing much of the route in the autumn — the seasonal minimum comes in late September.

Last verified 6 August 2026View full chronology

US strategic buffer

elevated

The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at 307.7 million barrels, its lowest since March 1983, while commercial crude at 404.5 million is the lowest since 2018 — both buffers falling at once, with US pump prices roughly $1–$1.50/gal above a year earlier.

  • SPR fell 3.8 million barrels in the week ending 24 July (EIA).
  • Commercial plus strategic stocks fell about 11 million barrels in one week.
  • Exxon and Chevron warn diesel and product supplies stay tight through H2 2026.

UK relevance: A thinner US emergency buffer weakens the system’s insurance against the next disruption, leaving the prices the UK imports at more exposed.

Watch next: Weekly EIA data — whether the combined strategic-plus-commercial drawdown continues.

Last verified 1 August 2026View full chronology

CPC / Kazakhstan

critical

CPC loadings are suspended again after a second drone attack on a tanker within a week. Kazakh production behind the route had already more than halved — Tengiz down from about 925,000 to 406,000 b/d — and the barrels predominantly feed Mediterranean and European refining.

  • Loadings suspended 30 July after a further tanker attack — the second interruption in a week.
  • Kazakh oil-and-condensate output fell to about 1 million b/d, less than half June’s average.
  • CPC carries over two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s exported crude — about 2% of world supply.

UK relevance: Lost CPC barrels tighten the European refining system that supplies the products the UK imports.

Watch next: Whether loadings resume and Kazakh production recovers toward June’s ~2.16 million b/d.

Last verified 30 July 2026View full chronology

LNG

elevated

Disrupted Hormuz transit has removed over 300 million cubic metres a day of Qatari and UAE LNG since 1 March (IEA); Ras Laffan remains offline; visible LNG transits have essentially halted while Adnoc loads with transponders off — and QatarEnergy is buying US spot cargoes to serve its own customers.

  • Nearly 1.9 million tonnes of LNG tanker capacity is holding inside the Gulf (S&P Global).
  • QatarEnergy has bought 33 US spot cargoes in 2026, worth roughly $1bn by Reuters estimates.
  • Edison: 24 cargoes cancelled or deferred April–September; 17 replaced, about 1.6 bcm.

UK relevance: Qatar’s replacement buying removes Atlantic cargoes that would otherwise supply the European market the UK draws gas from.

Watch next: Gulf storage filling toward forced production cuts — the ledger’s named next escalation to watch.

Last verified 30 July 2026View full chronology

Financial transmission

elevatedCorrection

The first marker has intensified: 30-year US Treasury yields reached a 19-year high above 5.3% in August, with fiscal concern now joining inflation. The second marker still has not fired — but the yen has strengthened to about 159 after a joint Japan-US intervention.

  • 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high above 5.3% on 18 August.
  • Correction: the yen has strengthened to about 159, not the 162 previously recorded.
  • Carry positions added, not unwound: Japanese investors bought over ¥5 trillion abroad.

UK relevance: Energy-driven rate repricing raises borrowing costs in the gilt market alongside Treasuries while equities weaken.

Watch next: Whether the September Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve decisions turn the carry trade toward forced repayment.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

Sulphur & phosphate fertiliser

critical

Sulphur scarcity is now cutting phosphate output across two continents: Mosaic has curtailed production in both the US and Brazil, running Bartow at 40% of target and making very little commodity fertiliser in Brazil. A supply-volume constraint, not just a price rise.

  • Mosaic curtailed output in both the US and Brazil; Bartow at 40% of targeted annual rate.
  • Third-quarter US sulphur settled at $705 per long ton, described as considerably below spot.
  • Mosaic named a second disruption alongside Hormuz: the Kazakhstan blockade.

UK relevance: Fertiliser supply risk feeds the food-price exposure of a country importing close to half its food with almost no domestic fertiliser production left.

Watch next: Whether further curtailment follows as sulphur inventories draw down at the curtailed sites.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

Chinese fertiliser controls

elevatedCorrection

Chinese policy now runs in two directions: phosphate exports remain suspended through August, while urea has been quota-liberalised since June under a 3.3 million tonne allocation. Sulphuric acid exports have been halted since May.

  • Correction: urea was quota-liberalised from June; the row previously described exports as uniformly retained.
  • Phosphate suspension covers DAP, MAP and selected NPK; 50–80% of export volumes restricted.
  • Both the phosphate suspension and the urea quota window expire this month.

UK relevance: Retained Chinese supply tightens the world fertiliser market a food-importing UK depends on.

Watch next: Whether Beijing extends, relaxes or replaces the phosphate suspension and urea quota window, both expiring this month.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

Brazil fertiliser exposure

elevated

Brazil imports about 85% of the fertiliser it consumes and covered effectively 100% of its urea needs by imports in 2025 — around 41% of those urea imports routed through Hormuz. Mosaic now reports making very little commodity fertiliser inside Brazil, removing part of the domestic cushion.

  • Mosaic reports making very little commodity fertiliser in Brazil on sulphur cost and availability.
  • USDA cut Brazil corn ending stocks to 10.10 million tonnes, from 11.10 in July.
  • Input prices split: international urea down 11.5% year-on-year, sulphur up 261%.

UK relevance: A weaker Brazilian harvest would tighten the global food balances behind UK import prices.

Watch next: September soybean planting — the key test of whether input disruption becomes reduced production.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

Mexico

elevatedNo state change

Reviewed with no state change: USDA left every line of its Mexico corn balance unchanged in August, including production at 24.6 and imports at 27.7 million tonnes. US produce prices are up 5.1% year-on-year but eased slightly in July.

  • USDA made no revision to Mexico corn in the August WASDE — reviewed, unchanged.
  • US fruit and vegetable CPI up 5.1% over twelve months, down 0.1% in July.
  • Cost-to-price attribution not established; reporting cites tariffs, labour and weather alongside inputs.

UK relevance: Pressure on the US food system propagates into the global prices the UK’s heavily imported food basket pays.

Watch next: Whether Mexican output falls far enough to move North American produce and feed prices.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

Global grain balance

elevated

USDA still projects both wheat and corn below consumption in 2026/27, but the two now diverge: corn ending stocks slipped to 274.7 million tonnes while wheat stocks were raised to 273.3. Less room on corn, marginally more on wheat.

  • August WASDE: world corn stocks 274.7 million tonnes, down 0.6 on the month.
  • World wheat stocks raised 0.4 to 273.3 million tonnes — the two crops diverge.
  • Russian and Ukrainian exports cut on Azov and Black Sea logistical disruption.

UK relevance: A thinner global grain margin leaves UK food import prices more exposed to the next shock.

Watch next: Any additional crop, trade or shipping shock landing on the reduced corn margin.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

European maize

critical

Three bodies now put the EU maize crop below the Coceral figure this row carried: the Commission at 51.9 and USDA at 50.2 million tonnes, against 52.7 previously. French conditions stood at 31% good or excellent on 3 August, a record low.

  • USDA cut EU corn production 3.6 million tonnes in one month, to 50.2.
  • European Commission put the 2026/27 harvest at 51.9 million tonnes, lowest since 2007.
  • FranceAgriMer conditions 31% good or excellent on 3 August, lowest since records began 2011.

UK relevance: A short EU maize crop raises the feed and food costs in the European market the UK buys from.

Watch next: The final harvest outturn against forecasts that have fallen every month since July.

Last verified 24 August 2026View full chronology

UKOilWatch assessment — This is not one isolated shortage but the convergence of war, chokepoint disruption, refinery damage, diesel scarcity, fertiliser restrictions, drought and narrowing grain reserves. Inventories, alternative routes and replacement suppliers are still preventing a generalised crisis — but those buffers are being consumed faster than the disrupted systems are being restored. For the UK specifically: close to half its food imported, almost no domestic fertiliser production left, and a net importer of the diesel that moves its farms, lorries and food — exposed at every link in the chain.

← Back to the dashboard · Complete evidence record: disruption chronology · For the analytical background, see the analysis archive and the Hormuz crisis timeline.