Hormuz has turned energy policy into a question of buffers. COP31 is still counting the wrong thing.
EuroOilWatch · 15 November 2026 · OilWatch Network Analysis
When traffic through the Strait of Hormuz all but stopped after the war began on 28 February, the world reached for its insurance. On 11 March the IEA's 32 member countries agreed the largest emergency stock release in the agency's history: 400 million barrels.[1] It worked the way insurance works. It bought time and took the edge off prices. It also got spent.
By the IEA's own accounting, observed global oil stocks have fallen by a cumulative 462 million barrels since the war began, close to half a billion.[2] In May the agency estimated that rebuilding the depleted stocks, strategic reserves included, would take roughly an extra million barrels a day of supply for three years, on top of underlying demand growth.[3]
That is the real backdrop to COP31, under way in Antalya until 20 November.[4] The conventional framing pits two jobs against each other. This winter, an energy minister must find fuel households can afford. Over the next decade, the same minister wants a system less exposed to the next shock. Climate summits are assumed to serve the second job at the expense of the first.
That framing is half right. The trade-off is overstated in one place and badly understated in another. The most useful question for Antalya is not whether climate cooperation still matters when the lights are at risk. It is whether the process can measure the thing energy ministers now care about most: exposure.
What the shock actually spent
Given the scale of the physical loss, the oil price rose by less than the disruption alone would have implied. Economists at the Bank of Italy attribute the gap to high pre-war inventories, emergency stock releases, rerouting and demand compression, which together absorbed the difference.[5]
That is precisely the problem. A price that looks manageable can conceal a buffer that is nearly spent. The first Hormuz shock landed on stocks at their highest level since February 2021.[6] A second shock would land on a cushion that has been drawn down and has barely begun to refill. Observed stocks rose by 52 million barrels in October, the first increase since June, but mostly because oil at sea jumped by 86 million barrels.[2] Refilling means buying the same barrels back at a time when every seller knows importers have to buy. The price measures the flow. The risk sits in the stock.
Seen this way, the question for importing governments is not "climate or security". It is: what kind of buffer do we build next?
Electrification as a standing reserve
A strategic stock is a one-off draw. You release it, you refill it, you pay twice, and you can use it only once per crisis.
Removed demand behaves differently. An electric bus, a heat pump or an electrified industrial boiler is a permanent cut in import requirement. It works on every day of every future disruption, it needs no refill, and nobody can embargo a barrel you no longer need. In buffer terms, demand that no longer exists is a reserve that cannot run out.
That is the strongest case for the COP31 presidency's flagship: a collective global goal to raise electricity's share of final energy demand from just over 20% today to 35% by 2035.[7] It is a voluntary pledge outside the negotiated text, and a group of countries endorsed it at the leaders' summit on 11 November.[8] Türkiye holds the COP31 presidency. Australia's climate minister, Chris Bowen, leads the formal negotiations as "President of Negotiations".[9] Türkiye pitches electrification as protection against "volatile energy markets", and its COP31 president, Murat Kurum, puts it more bluntly: "energy that you import is energy that you do not control."[7][10] That argument deserves to be taken more seriously than climate summitry usually is, because it speaks directly to the problem finance and security ministries are now trying to solve.
But the reserve is only real under three conditions, and the pledge secures none of them.
The power must not come from the same chokepoint. Electrify transport and heating on gas-fired power and you have moved your exposure from the forecourt to the power station. Before the war, roughly a fifth of the world's LNG trade passed through Hormuz.[11] The presidency's launch material speaks of a shift to "clean electricity", but the pledge itself does not commit anyone to clean power.[7][12]
The grid must be able to deliver it. A reserve you cannot dispatch is not a reserve. In most large economies the binding constraint is now grid connections, transmission and flexibility, not generation. An electrification target without a grid target is a promise about demand with nothing behind it on supply.
The new dependencies must be the right kind. Electrification swaps dependence on oil and gas for dependence on minerals, cells, panels and transformers, much of it concentrated in a few suppliers. That is a real risk, but it is a different shape of risk. An oil import is a flow: cut it and the economy stops within weeks. Equipment is a stock: cut it and new building slows, while installed capacity keeps working. A blockade of solar panels does not switch off the panels already on the roof. Policymakers who treat the two as equivalent are misreading the risk.
Where the trade-off is real, and underestimated
If the trade-off is overstated at the level of physics, it is understated at the level of politics and capital.
Every short-run response to the shock is defensible on its own: refilling strategic stocks, signing long-term LNG contracts, deferring refinery maintenance, keeping coal plants on standby, approving upstream projects to "secure supply". Together, they build path dependency. Assets financed in a crisis run for decades. This is the hysteresis the summit framing misses. A system pushed hard does not return to its old path when the pressure eases. The response to the first shock shapes the vulnerability to the second shock, and to the climate.
This is where the case against COP31 is strongest, because a summit has almost no grip on these decisions. They are made in treasuries, energy ministries and procurement offices.
The numbers confirm how little the process has bent the curve. UNEP's 2026 Emissions Gap Report finds that full delivery of all current national pledges, including those conditional on international support, points to about 2.6°C of warming this century, or 2.7°C for the unconditional pledges alone. Current policies point to around 2.8°C. Fully delivered, the pledges would cut emissions 11–15% by 2035 against 2025 levels; the lowest pathway that returns warming to 1.5°C requires about 45%.[13] The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took effect on 27 January 2026. Its exit from the UN climate convention itself takes effect on 27 February 2027, and the federal government has sent no delegation to Antalya.[14]
On fossil fuels themselves, the negotiated language has barely moved since Dubai's 2023 call to transition away from them. The COP30 decision in Belém left fossil fuels out. The roadmap Brazil's presidency produced instead is voluntary, and countries are not obliged to act on it.[15] The Antalya action agenda carries no fossil-fuel initiative of its own. The presidency mentions the transition away from fossil fuels, but its working argument is that electrification will reduce fossil use by itself.[7][16] Producers including Saudi Arabia and Russia, and large emerging economies including India and China, resist any firmer framing.[12] Nothing about the energy shock has changed that arithmetic, and in producer capitals high prices have strengthened it.
Finance: the shock hits the same countries twice
UNEP's 2026 Adaptation Gap Report puts international public adaptation finance to developing countries at $28.2–31.7 billion in 2024, against needs of around $305 billion a year by 2035. Even if the COP30 aspiration to triple those flows is met, it would cover only 20–29% of needs, after inflation.[17]
Two points sharpen this. First, targeting matters more than totals: UNEP estimates that tripling flows to the least developed countries and small island states could meet 49–83% of their needs.[17] That is the logic behind projects like the raised, flood-safe land built in Tuvalu's capital, Funafuti, under a UNDP-run project financed by the Green Climate Fund and Australia.[18] It is also a reason for vulnerable states to keep turning up.
Second, the energy shock is itself an adaptation story. Import-dependent developing economies, in Southeast Asia and beyond, have spent this year paying crisis prices for fuel.[19] Every dollar of an emergency import bill is a dollar not spent on sea walls, drainage or drought-resistant agriculture. For these countries, electrification finance and adaptation finance are not separate negotiating tracks. They come out of the same budget.
What would make Antalya count
COP31 still matters, but not because countries need somewhere to talk. It matters if it changes what gets measured, because what gets measured is what treasuries fund. Four tests:
- Tie electrification to clean power. A 35% target that can be met on gas leaves Hormuz exposure intact. The outcome should say where the electricity comes from.
- Count exposure, not just emissions. Parties already report emissions under the Paris Agreement's transparency framework.[20] Inviting them to report fossil import dependence alongside it would let the second global stocktake, which concludes in late 2028, show whether climate policy is also reducing vulnerability to shocks.[12] That is the one metric a finance or defence ministry would read.
- Finance grids where the shock bit hardest. Concessional money for transmission and storage in import-dependent developing economies serves mitigation, adaptation and security at once.
- Judge by 2028, not by the closing plenary. Does adaptation money reach projects, and on what terms? Do electrification pledges turn into grid investment? Does the stocktake have the evidence to say which policies cut both emissions and exposure?
The lesson of 2026 is not that energy security trumps climate. It is that the world has just found out what its emergency buffers are worth, and how fast they go. A summit cannot refill them. It can help decide whether the next decade's buffer is another tank of oil, or demand that is no longer there.
Related: The Second Shock Is Not the First, our July audit of the buffers the spring spent.
Sources
- IEA — IEA Member countries to carry out largest ever oil stock release amid market disruptions from Middle East conflict, 11 March 2026.
- IEA — Oil Market Report, November 2026, 13 November 2026.
- IEA — Oil Market Report, May 2026, 13 May 2026.
- Climate Home News — COP31 briefing: what to expect from the Antalya climate summit, 5 November 2026.
- CEPR VoxEU — Energy markets under chokepoint stress: the 2026 Hormuz shock (D'Orazio, Emiliozzi, Ferriani, Gazzani, Taboga and Veronese, Bank of Italy), 17 September 2026.
- IEA — Oil Market Report, March 2026, 12 March 2026.
- COP31 Presidency — Action Agenda press release, Bonn, 9 June 2026.
- WRI — Statement: countries endorse 35x35 electrification pledge at COP31, 11 November 2026.
- Climate Home News — Türkiye says it has final decision at COP31 despite Australia running negotiations, 11 September 2026.
- Al Jazeera — Türkiye pushes electrification to top of climate agenda as COP31 set to open, 9 November 2026.
- IEA — Strait of Hormuz, last updated February 2026.
- Climate Home News, 5 November 2026 (as source 4).
- Carbon Brief — UNEP: opportunity has been lost to meet 1.5C warming limit without overshoot, 21 October 2026.
- E&E News — So long, Paris: US officially leaves landmark climate pact, 27 January 2026; UN depositary notification C.N.102.2026; Boston Globe / AP — COP31 UN climate summit in Türkiye, 10 November 2026.
- Carbon Brief — Q&A: What is in the global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels, updated 14 November 2026.
- Heinrich Böll Foundation — COP31: overshoot, financial injustice and the fight for a fossil-free future, 29 October 2026.
- UNEP — As world heads for overshoot of 1.5°C, adaptation is too slow (Adaptation Gap Report 2026 press release, via Eco-Business), November 2026.
- Green Climate Fund — FP015: Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project; Prime Minister of Australia — Strengthening regional ties through the Pacific Islands Forum, 10 November 2023.
- Asian Development Bank — Asia and Pacific growth outlook sharply downgraded as Middle East conflict disruptions deepen, 29 April 2026; ADB — Asian Development Outlook, September 2026.
- UNFCCC — Enhanced transparency framework.