Brent ended Friday near $71.94 and WTI near $68.78, and prompt Brent has slipped below later-dated contracts — a contango structure that signals the market is pricing a near-term glut. That glut is real, but it is largely the release of stranded barrels, not a return to normal. A low oil price is not evidence that Hormuz is safe.
Tankers are returning — but selectively
New shipping data give the clearest answer yet to the question that matters: will the ships come back? Shipbroker BRS counted 98 tanker crossings of Hormuz between 22 and 28 June — 47 laden tankers leaving, 41 empty (ballast) tankers entering, and 10 other movements. The return of ballast tankers is genuine evidence that some owners are prepared to sail back for fresh cargoes.
But the recovery is partial. Combined Gulf crude and condensate exports were about 10.1 million barrels per day in June — roughly 40% below the ~16.5 mb/d pre-conflict norm. And according to Kpler, only around 23 million barrels of the earlier backlog remained to cross the strait. Once that floating-storage wave is exhausted, the market must rely on newly produced oil and repeated voyages — not one-off destocking.
The major lines are staying away
The clearest sign that this is not yet a normal reopening: CMA CGM, the world's third-largest container line, said on 3 July it does not currently intend to send ships back towards the Gulf — and that Iranian authorities were advising it not to. Its San Antonio, hit by a missile earlier in the conflict, was damaged badly enough to face scrapping, and the company remains opposed to any Hormuz transit fees.
The result is a two-speed reopening: selected oil tankers move under exceptional arrangements, while routine container traffic — and normal commercial confidence — has not returned.
Officially, still "substantial"
The latest JMIC transit advisory (27 June) rates the Hormuz threat SUBSTANTIAL, warning that mines remain present, clearance is ongoing, naval forces are active, and vessels must use specified corridors and expect congestion and VHF hailing. The widened southern route is an emergency managed corridor, not a restoration of normal navigation. A UK–France-led mine-clearance mission — including the Royal Navy's RFA Lyme Bay — is deploying to help reopen the strait, but Iran has rejected any foreign clearance, insisting it will do it alone.
Britain's real exposure: diesel, not crude
The most important signal for the UK is moving the opposite way to crude. Russia is weighing a full diesel-export ban — President Putin said publicly he is considering it — amid domestic shortages and Ukrainian drone damage to its refineries. Russian seaborne diesel exports fell to about 426,000 bpd in June, roughly half a year earlier and the lowest since 2017. Northwest European diesel inventories — the pool Britain draws on across the Channel via the ARA hub — are down about 20% since the conflict began, and diesel refining margins have risen above $46 a barrel.
Britain is heavily import-dependent for diesel and jet fuel, with North Sea output long past its peak and limited domestic refining. So crude is cheapening while diesel stays scarce and highly profitable to refine — and diesel is what actually moves UK freight, farming, construction and industry. A Russian ban could stop lower crude prices from reaching the pump.
The supply backdrop
OPEC output rebounded by 3.3 mb/d in June to 19.43 mb/d (Reuters survey) as Kuwait and Iran restarted shut-in volumes — though that is the 11-member total after the UAE's 1 May exit, and it remains well below quotas. OPEC+ is expected to weigh a further 188,000-bpd increase for August at its Sunday meeting, which would add to near-term downward pressure on crude.
Bottom line
The crude market is beginning to price oversupply, while shipping security stays poor and Britain's refined-fuel market tightens. The stranded-oil backlog pulling Brent down is nearly spent; the physical and political risk is not. A low oil price is not evidence that Hormuz is safe.